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LIGHTS, CAMERA, ACTION: VIDEO
CAMERAS AS TOOLS OF JUSTICE
MATTHEW

D.

THURLOWt

The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
1
the actual criminals themselves.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A little over twelve years ago, William Geller wrote an influential
paper for the National Institute of Justice advocating the use of video
cameras as a means of preventing false confessions. 2 In a national survey, 3 Geller found that nearly every police agency that chose to adopt
videotaping found it advantageous. 4 Police departments cited the benefits of recording in preserving critical evidence for trial, defusing allegations of coerced confessions, and monitoring police interrogation
practices. 5 Contrary to fears that the presence of a video camera would
discourage suspects from confessing, Geller's survey indicated that videotaped suspects actually made more incriminating statements than nont J.D. Yale Law School, 2005. Special thanks to the editorial staff at John Marshall
Law School, Professor Steven Duke, Cyd Fremmer, and Jaqueline Guzman.
1. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959) (Earl Warren, C.J.).
2. William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogationsand Confessions, Natl. Inst. of Just.
(1993).
3. Id. at 1-3 (noting that over 2,400 police agencies recorded police interrogations in
57,000 cases).
4. Id. at 10-11 (Geller found that 97 percent of police agencies found videotaping useful, and 59.4 percent strongly approved continuing videotaping).
5. Id. at 6 ("The vast majority of surveyed agencies that videotape interviews believed
that videotaping has led to improvements in police interrogations. These include: better
preparation for interviews by investigators; ... [fewer distractions]; supervisors' monitoring
of the interrogation on closed-circuit television or by subsequent viewing to assess interrogators' performance; use of old tapes to train both new and experienced detectives in interview techniques; and an ability to show an accomplice's taped confession to an
uncooperative suspect . . ").
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videotaped suspects. 6 In 2005, hundreds of American police depart7
ments routinely recorded station house interrogations and confessions.
However, despite the widely perceived need for uniform electronic recording requirements among police officers and prosecutors s few videotaping laws have emerged from American courts or state legislatures.
Criminal justice reformers have pushed for mandatory recording
rules for over forty years. In his 1956 book on criminal investigation,
Charles O'Hara advocated video recording of all suspect interviews and
interrogations. 9 The American Law Institute has lobbied for an electronic recording requirement since publication of the Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure in 1975,10 and the American Bar Association recently adopted a resolution calling for all American police departments
to record interrogations. I x Despite overwhelming evidence that videotaping protects the constitutional rights of suspects and increases police
accountability, twenty-four state supreme courts have declined
mandatory videotaping rules in the last twenty years. 12 While many of
these courts have argued in favor of taping interrogations as a matter of
policy, 13 they have been reluctant to read a recording rule into state constitutions. Likewise, no federal or state court has found that the U.S.
Constitution gives a suspect the right to a video recorded police
14
interview.
Only the Alaska and Minnesota Supreme Courts have mandated
6. Id. (Geller also found that taping provided more exculpatory information).
7. Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording Interrogations (Ctr. on
Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern University School of Law)(Summer 2004)(available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/FalseConfessions2.htm).
8. See William Schwabe, Lois M. Davis & Brian A. Jackson, Challenges and Choices
for Crime-FightingTechnology: FederalSupport of State and Local Law Enforcement 105
(Rand 2001) (In a recent survey, 64 percent of police departments serving more than
225,000 people listed technological improvements as a high priority in improving police
accountability).
9. Charles E. O'Hara, Fundamentalsof CriminalProcedure127-32 (1956) ("The ideal
solution [for taping] is the sound motion picture, that combination of sound and sight which
most nearly represents to the sense the event itself.").
10. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proc., § 130.4 (ALI 1975).
11. Susan Saulny, National Law Group Endorses Videotaping of Interrogations,N.Y.
Times B4 (Feb. 10, 2004).
12. The twenty-four state supreme courts that have found that due process does not
mandate electronic recording of station house interrogations include: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington and West Virginia. See infra n. 145.
13. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Mass. 1996).
14. See e.g. U.S. v. Huber, 66 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003)(unpublished); U.S. v.
Short, 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).
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videotaping interrogations at police stations for all criminal suspects.' 5
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held that all custodial interrogations of juveniles must be electronically recorded where feasible. 16 In
addition, New Hampshire requires that all videotaped interviews admitted into evidence must include the entire interrogation, 1 7 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court grants defendants with unrecorded confessions
the right to provide jurors with a cautionary instruction.' 8
On the legislative side, the Illinois, New Mexico, and Maine state
legislatures also recently adopted recording requirements, 19 and Texas
protects defendants against the admission of uncorroborated, oral confessions. 20 Although at least eighteen state legislatures considered videotaping legislation between 2004-2005, no other state requires the
videotaping of interrogations. 2 1 Where state legislatures and the judiciary are making only limited progress, public pressure has begun to make
inroads. As the cost of equipment falls and police officers and prosecutors become more cognizant of the potential pitfalls of unrecorded interrogations, police agencies across the country have begun recording
suspect interviews and confessions.
A number of highly publicized exonerations and lost convictions
have finally compelled many police agencies to equip interrogation rooms
with cameras. 2 2 In Illinois, the exoneration of dozens of death row inmates, some of which were convicted on the basis of false confessions,
helped prompt the passage of a law requiring recording all interrogations
of homicide and sex-crimes suspects. 23 Racial profiling on Baltimore
15. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Wis. 1994); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156
(Alaska 1985).
16. See State v. Jerrell, 699 N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2005).
17. See New Hampshire v. Barnett, 789 A.2d 629 (N.H. 2001).
18. See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista,813 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 2004).
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 3 (2004).
21. See infra Part IV. The eighteen other states where taping legislation has been introduced include: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.
22. See e.g. Michael McGuire, Taped InterrogationsGain Momentum in Florida, Chi.
Trib. 1C (Mar. 8, 2003) (noting that in Broward County, Florida, after dubious confessions
were uncovered in up to 38 cases, all interrogations in serious felony cases will now be
recorded. Broward County, Sheriff Ken Jenne claims that electronic recording was necessary because, "[w]e realized that people were calling into scrutiny the ... confessions." He
reasoned, "[i] f you are not doing anything wrong, why aren't you videotaping the process?").
23. Rod Warden, The Role of False Confessions in Illinois Wrongful Murder Convictions Since 1970, Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern University School of Law
(May 12, 2003) (available at http'//www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/FalseConfessions2.htm) (Warden notes, '[slince 1970, 42 wrongful murder convictions have
been documented in Illinois. Twenty-five of the convictions, or 59.5 percent, rested in whole
or part on false confessions.").
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freeways led to a recent court order mandating video recording of all traffic stops. 24 In late 2003, Broward County, Florida, police agencies buckled under public pressure and voluntarily adopted a video recording
requirement after a local newspaper uncovered an astonishing thirtyeight false confession cases. 25 The Dallas, Texas, police department
adopted videotaping after a woman claimed that she was raped by officers in an interrogation room and another suspect alleged he had been
beaten. 2 6 The Washington D.C. council passed a recording bill in 2003,27
the New York city council has considered a recording proposal, 28 and
hundreds more police departments have already adopted videotaping
policies. Internationally, video recording of interrogations has been required by law in the United Kingdom since adoption of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act of 1984,29 and videotaped interrogations are also
30
used in Australia, Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand.
This paper is an effort to review the costs and benefits of video recording and the academic literature on videotaping interrogations and
confessions. I hope that my findings are useful in identifying the issues
and concerns that must be addressed before adopting a formal recording
policy or implementing a state-mandated video recording rule. I have
divided this paper into eight sections and I will analyze video recording
in three different contexts: in interrogation rooms, in patrol cars, and
with hand-held cameras. Several scholars have made the case for video
recording of interrogations in station houses. 3 1 I will argue that it is
necessary to broaden videotaping rules to cover nearly all "custodial interrogations" for those rules to be meaningful. Although patrol car and
24. See Laura Barnhardt, State Police to DistributeBrochures, Balt. Sun 1B (Nov. 7,
2003).
25. See Wanda DeMarzo & Daniel De Vise, Zealous Grilling by Police Tainted 38 Murder Cases, Miami Herald (December 22, 2002) (available at http://www.miami.com/mld/
miamiheraldl 4791670.htm); Michael Mayo, Tim Brown Juror:He Deserves Another Trial,
Sun-Sentinel. 1B (Jan. 21, 2003).
26. See Jason Trahan, Police to Videotape Confessions, Dallas Morning News (May 29,
2005).
27. Craig Timberg, Council Sets Aside D.C. Drug Initiative Calling for Treatment,
Newsbytes 3 (Dec. 18, 2002).
28. Crime, False Confessions and Videotape, N.Y. Times A22 (Jan. 10, 2003).
29. Gisli Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations,Confessions and Testimony 39
(2002).
30. See Wayne T. Westling & Vicky Waye, Videotaping Interrogations:Lessons from
Australia, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 493 (1998); Anthony Karstaedt, Videotaping Police Interviews
with Suspects, 4 Murdoch U. Elec. J. L. 1 (Mar. 1997) (available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/ v4nl/karst.txt) (noting that the New Zealand recording requirement went into effect on November 4, 1996); Sullivan, supra n. 7, at 19 n. 15.
31. See e.g. Steven A. Drizin & Beth Colgan, Let the Cameras Rolls: Mandatory Videotaping Interrogationsis the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confession, 32 Loy. U.
Chi. L.J. 337 (Winter 2001) [hereinafter "Drizin & Colgan"].
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hand-held cameras introduce some unique policy and technology concerns, the drawbacks and advantages of these cameras are relatively
analogous to interrogation room cameras.
In section II, I explore the roles criminal suspects and police officers
play in false confessions. In section III, I discuss how courts analyze the
behavior of these parties in determining whether a confession is involuntary. I conclude that videotaping is vital to ensure that courts make informed due process determinations. In section IV, I survey judicially
mandated, statutory, and locally implemented video recording rules. In
section V, I examine the faults within these rules and propose that video
recording laws must apply to criminal suspects taken into "custody,"
rather than merely those detained at station houses. In section VI, I
explore the feasibility of video cameras in police cars and hand-held cameras. In section VII, I probe the strengths and weaknesses of challenges
to videotaping interrogations and confessions. In section VIII, I note the
benefits of a broad recording rule for criminal suspects. Finally, in section IX, I describe the advantages of videotaping for police officers and
prosecutors.
II.
A.

FALSE CONFESSIONS

THE INCIDENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY OF

FALSE

CONFESSION

32
Some 42-76 percent of criminal suspects confess to the police.
Most of these suspects are guilty, but some confess to crimes that they
have not committed. 3 3 Professor Paul Cassell estimates that false confession plays a role in only 1 in 90,000 convictions. 3 4 However, Professors Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe sharply criticize Cassell's attempt to
quantify the incidence of false confession. 35 Leo & Ofshe claim that calculating police-induced or wrongful convictions is impossible because no
records are kept on the frequency of interrogation and confession in the
U.S., few police agencies record interrogations in their entirety, and
many false confessions may go unnoticed by the media and
36
researchers.
It is difficult to calculate the extent of false confessions, but the advent of DNA technology has allowed criminal justice reformers to more

32. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 51.
33. See David Howard, New Mission: Recording Police Interrogations,N.Y. Times, 13
CN (May 25, 1997) (stating some Connecticut prosecutors and police official believe that
Peter O'Reilly was wrongly exonerated in his mother's death).
34. Paul G. Cassell, CriminalLaw: Protectingthe Innocentfrom False Confessions and
Lost Confessions - And From Miranda, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497, 520 (1998) [hereinafter "Lost Confessions"].
35. Richard Leo & Richard Ofshe, CriminalLaw: Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda:Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 557, 560 (1998).
36. Id.
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easily identify these cases. 3 7 In 1998, Leo and Ofshe found sixty cases of
false confession in the post-Miranda era. 38 By late 2003, Leo and Steve
39
Drizin compiled a more inclusive list of 136 cases of false confession.
With substantive proof of innocence in many "air-tight" confession cases,
reformers contend that false confession may be much more prevalent
40
than previously thought.
False confessors admit to crimes they have not committed for a variety of reasons, many of which remain unclear to psychologists and criminal reformers. 4 1 Some individuals voluntarily confess to crimes that
they have not committed because they seek notoriety. 42 Psychologists
note that over 200 individuals falsely confessed to the kidnapping of
Charles Lindbergh's baby son, and over 30 people confessed to the slaying of aspiring, Hollywood actress Elizabeth Short (the "Black Dahlia"). 43 Still other suspects confess because they are delusional, wish to
punish themselves, or hope to protect the actual perpetrator. 44 Finally,
some suspects may even voluntarily confess to lesser crimes for fear of
45
being implicated in more serious crimes.
Psychologist and false confession-guru, Gisli Gudjonssen found that
"the two most relevant endurable psychological characteristics in the assessment of [false confessors], however, were interrogative suggestibility
and compliance." 46 Although some individuals are much more susceptible than others to confessing, he notes that healthy, normal people are
37. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Devil in Confessions, 5 Psych. Science in the Pub.
Interest 3 (Nov. 2004) (indicating that 115 of the Innocence Project's DNA-based exonerations were false confession cases).
38. Richard Leo & Richard Ofshe, Criminal Law: the Consequences of False Confessions, Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriagesof Justice in the Age of PsychologicalInterrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429, 433-36 (1998) [hereinafter "Leo & Ofshe,
Consequences"] (noting that in thirty-four of these cases the confessions have been proven
false by scientific evidence, capture of the true perpetrator, or discovery that no crime had
taken place).
39. See Richard Leo & Steven Drizin, Proven False Confession Cases, in Recording of
Custodial Interrogations: A Resource Guide, 1-3 (Innocence Project, New York, N.Y. June
6, 2003).
40. Illinois to Require Police to Tape Every Homicide Interrogation,Seattle Times, A2
(July 18, 2003); see also Warden, supra n. 23. The Innocence Project further notes that
false confessions played a role in 23 percent of convictions overturned by DNA evidence.
See Crime, False Confessions and Videotape, N.Y. Times A22 (Jan. 10, 2003), Ultimately, as
many as 48 percent of false confessors are wrongly convicted and imprisoned. Leo & Ofshe,
Consequences, supra n. 38, at 477.
41. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 224-26; Richard P. Conti, The Psychology of False Confessions, 2 J. Credibility Assessment & Witness Psychol. 14, 20 (1999).
42. Conti, supra n. 41, at 22.
43. Id.
44. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 226-27; Conti, supra n. 41, at 21.
45. Conti, supra n. 41, at 21.
46. Gudjonnson, supra n. 29, at 155.
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prone to falsely confess. 4 7 The literature on the psychology of confessions identifies two types of involuntary confessors. "Coerced-compliant"
suspects may endure such high levels of stress during police interrogations that they cannot "exercise their powers of judgment and legal
rights." 48 These false confessors may feel intimidated by officers and believe that resistance to the officer's questioning is futile. 49 Or, they may
even escape prison altogether
reason that they can mitigate their guilt or 50
by acceding to the interrogator's demands.
By contrast, a second group of innocent confessors can become convinced that it is possible that they actually committed the offense. These
"coerced-internalized" suspects may doubt their own memories and readily agree with an officer's hypothetical account of events. 5 1 One such
false confessor, fourteen-year-old Michael Crowe, admitted to killing his
sister only after telling detectives:
Like I said, the only way I even know I did this is that she's dead and
that the evidence says I did it. You could find someone else did it, and I
pray to God someone else did. I think it's too late for that. I think I did
it.

52

What caused Crowe to accept officers' version of events? Some psychologists argue that intense interrogation of impressionable suspects
false memocan induce a hypnotic state in which detectives can implant
53
ries or, at the very least, inculcate grave uncertainty.
Unsurprisingly, young and mentally handicapped defendants are
particularly prone to psychological coercion. 54 Psychologist Peter Conti
47. Id. at 259.
48. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 227; Conti, supra n. 41, at 27.
49. See e.g. Ken Armstrong et al., Coercive and Illegal Tactics Torpedo some Cook
County Murder Cases, Chi. Trib., Dec. 16, 2001 (available at www.chicagotribune.com/
news/specials/ chi-011216confession.story) (Sang Kim confessed to the death of his girlfriend's baby after over 30 hours of detention and interrogation in which he alleges that
officers deprived him of sleep, yelled at him, and jabbed him).
50. Id.
51. Conti, supra n. 41, at 22-23 (Until recently, there was no empirical evidence for the
concept of coerced-internalized false confessions. However, eyewitness memory researchers have found that misleading post-event information can alter actual or reported memories of observed events).
52. Edwin Dobb, False Confessions: Scaring Suspects to Death, www.amnestyusa.org/
amnestynow/false_confessions.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
53. Conti, supra n. 41, at 23; Richard J. Ofshe, Inadvertent Hypnosis DuringInterrogation, 40 Intl. J. Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 125 (1992) (available at http://
ijceh.edu.wsw.edu).
54. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 144; Saul M. Kassin & Gisli Gudjonnson, The Psychology of False Confessions:A Review of Literature and Issues, 5 Psych. Sci. in the Pub. Interest 51-53 (Nov. 2004); see also Welsh White, False Confessions and the Constitution:
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev.
105, 121-25 (1997) [hereinafter "Safeguards"].(referring to the case of Earl Washington as
an example of a false confession based on mental incapacity. Washington, a twenty-three
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notes that suspects with poor memories, anxiety, low intelligence, and
deflated self-esteem are extremely susceptible to an officer's suggestions. 55 Mentally handicapped suspects may not even comprehend the
significance of their confessions. 5 6 Individuals impaired from drug and
alcohol use are similarly prone to confess falsely. 57 In State v. Rhodes,58
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the death sentence for a suspect even
after the arresting officer testified that shortly before his confession:
Paul Rhodes was either acting as if he was high on some kind of narcotic, or ... narcotics. He had to be helped to walk. He swayed back
and forth when he sat down, almost in a drunken stupor. Didn't say too
much, and when he did he mumbled, as if, I would take it, he was not in
59
control of his senses.

Although courts consider a suspect's personal characteristics and
predisposition to confess falsely as an element in making due process
"voluntariness" determinations, the Supreme Court held that confessions made by impaired suspects are admissible in Colorado v. Connelly.6 0 Absent evidence of police coercion, courts do not consider the
mental state or condition of a suspect in judging the admissibility of a
confession.

61

B.

THE POLICE AND FALSE CONFESSION

Although some suspects are more predisposed to confessing falsely
than others, interrogating officers also contribute to the incidence of
year old suspect with an I.Q. of sixty-nine was arrested for burglary. After confessing to
three rapes that he could not have committed, Washington implicated himself in the rape
and murder of a local teenager. After ten years on death row, DNA evidence proved that
the sperm found on the victim's body did not match his).
55. Conti, supra n. 41, at 24.
56. Id. (noting the case of Delbert Ward, a 59-year-old farmer with an IQ of 69. A
psychologist that interviewed Ward after he confessed to the murder of his brother believed
that it was highly probable that Ward would have been so confused during the interrogation that he would have readily agreed with anything the investigators told him). See also
Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness:The Need for Electronic Recording of CustodialInterrogations,6 B.U. Pub. Int. L. J. 719, 721 (noting the case of Richard Lapointe, an individual suffering from a congenital brain disorder that left him
impaired. Lapointe confessed to the rape and murder of his wife's grandmother after over
nine hours of interrogation).
57. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 43 (citing Brighton study); see also Wayne T. Westling,
Something is Rotten in the InterrogationRoom: Let's Try Video Oversight, 34 John Marshall L. Rev. 537, 538 (2001) (noting the case of Mountoun T. Hart. Police dispute Hart's
claim that he was drunk and high on marijuana when he confessed to killing a schoolteacher. A Manhattan jury discounted the confession after viewing pictures of the suspect
on the night of the confession that seemed to indicate that he was "drunk or high.").
58. State v. Rhodes, 820 P.2d 665 (Idaho 1991).
59. Id. at 801.
60. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
61. Id. at 164.
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false confessions. Indeed, some scholars argue that aggressive officers,
rather than amenable suspects, are primarily responsible for sham confessions.6 2 Coercive interviewing strategies can be understood in light of
the importance of confessions in criminal cases. 6 3 A study by Baldwin &
McConville (1980), found that confession evidence was vital in 30 percent
of prosecutions," and other commentators have placed that figure even
65
higher.
Because suspects have different emotional and mental capacities
and react differently to police tactics, Leo & Ofshe contend that identifying coercion is often difficult. 6 6 In one study, however, Leo found that
officers employed openly coercive interviewing tactics in approximately 2
percent of the cases he observed. 6 7 Although police manuals on the art of
interrogation discourage officers from inducing confessions through use
of illegal threats or promises, they often encourage officers to use tactics
68
that elicit involuntary confessions.
In his oft-revised 1942 tome on police interrogation, 6 9 Fred Inbau
contends that officers should "display an air of confidence in the suspect's
guilt" and "call attention to the subject's physiological and psychological
'symptoms' of guilt."70 He argues that officers should express sympathy
with the suspect and even reduce the moral seriousness of an offense or
blame the victims of a crime. 7 1 Inbau admits that many of these tactics
are deceptive and "unfair," but claims "it can be stated with the utmost
confidence that none of the methods are apt to induce an innocent person
72
to confess a crime he did not commit."
Richard Leo, however, notes that Inbau's "unfair" tactics can in62. See Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 224 ("Kennedy (1986) considers that 'over-zealousness' on the part of police officers is the single most common cause [of false confession].").
63. Conti, supra n. 41, at 14-15.
64. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 80.
65. Conti, supra n. 41, at 15 (estimating that police solved 80 percent of cases by obtaining confessions and Dr. W. Sargent claims that without confessions 70 percent of convictions in Great Britain may be lost).
66. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra n. 38.
67. Richard Leo, CriminalLaw: Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 266, 282-83 (1996) [hereinafter "Leo, Inside"].
68. See Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid & Joseph P. Buckley, CriminalInterrogationsand
Confessions 216 (3d ed., 1986) ("[Tjhe opportunity to interrogate a suspect must be lawfully
obtained.., there must be an avoidance of force, threat of force, or promise of leniency...
trickery or deceit must not be of such a nature as to 'shock the conscience' of the court or

community.").
69. Fred E. Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation(1st ed., Williams & Wilkins Co 1942).
70. Id. at 81-96.
71. Id. at 115-117.
72. Id. at 117.
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crease the probability of a false confession. 7 3 When Inbau's suggestions
are combined with isolation from legal counsel, officers' claims of incriminating scientific evidence and lengthy and emotionally intense interroga74
tions, officers can break the will of both guilty and innocent suspects.
In 1991, Leo Bruce falsely confessed to participating in the murder of
nine people at a Buddhist temple near Phoenix, Arizona, after fifteen
hours of interrogation. 7 5 Officers convinced Bruce they had conclusive
evidence of his guilt. But Bruce later claimed that he confessed out of
sheer exhaustion: "I just wanted it to end right there. I wanted to
76
sleep."
If a suspect appears to be breaking under stress or exhaustion, officers may go so far as to help a suspect explain how and why he/she
committed the crime. 77 By providing the false confessor with the details
of the crime the officer not only obtains the confession, but he also ensures that the story matches the corroborative evidence needed to make
the confession admissible.
As Kassin and Gudjonsson point out, detectives' ability to identify
presumptively guilty suspects is no better than chance. 78 Ultimately, an
interrogator's erroneous belief that a suspect is guilty may not only make
the officer more likely to elicit a false confession, it may also have an
anchoring effect, slanting the officer's investigation of the case and interpretation of the evidence. 79 A number of studies in Britain and Australia also note that when detectives are convinced of a suspect's guilt but
are unable to obtain a confession, they often engage in the practice of
73. Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, in the MirandaDebate 273 (3d
ed. Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas (1998).
74. Gudjonnson, supra n. 29, at 231 (Arguing, these coercive tactics are used because
they help officers obtain more confessions in general); see also Kassin & Gudjonnson, supra
n. 54 (arguing that three police tactics in particular have a tendency to lead to false confession including: isolation, the presentation of false incriminating evidence, and minimization of the consequences of admitting guilt).
75. White, supra n. 54, at 133.
76. Id.
77. See e.g. Leo & Ofshe, supra n. 38, at 463. (stating Gary Gauger confessed to officers' version of his parents murder after 18 hours of interrogation. No physical evidence
linked him to the crime and his account was inconsistent with forensic evidence collected at
the scene); Leo & Ofshe, supra n. 38, at 470 (referring to the confession of Luis Roberto
Benavidiz as an example of a "probable false confession." Benavidiz confessed to a Simi
Valley, California, murder after police threatened to charge his girlfriend and place his
daughter in a foster home). See also Ruben Castaneda, InterrogationProblems Caught on
Video in Md., Wash. Post (Oct. 27, 2003) (including the videotaped confession of Richard B.
Gater which was thrown out by Circuit Court Judge Thomas P. Smith after an officer on
camera threatened that if Gater did not reveal the location of the murder weapon, armed
officers might storm his mother's house and use force against her); Drizin & Colgan, supra
n. 31, at 341.
78. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra n. 54, at 37-39.
79. Id. at 41.
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"verballing" or lying about the details of a suspect's confession.8 0 Several
scholars argue that American police officers engage in similar behavior.8 ' In one troubling survey, when asked to estimate the incidence of
police perjury during evidence suppression hearings, judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors estimated that police officers lied approxi82
mately 20 percent of the time.
III.

DUE PROCESS AND THE TOTALITY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST

The Supreme Court has ruled that confessions that are involuntarily
obtained in violation of the suspect's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights are inadmissible.8 3 In considering whether or not a confession is involuntary, the court applies a totality of the circumstances
test.8 4 In Green v.Scully,8 5 the Second Circuit held that three factors
should be considered in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession: "(1) the characteristics of the accused, (2) the conditions of interrogation, and (3) the conduct of law enforcement officials."8 6 Courts may
use their discretion in weighing each factor in making due process determinations.8 7 The Supreme Court has held, however, that the defendant
80. See Westling & Waye, supra n. 30, at 526 ("For decades in Australia, Britain, and
Ireland, there have been claims of wholesale fabrication of oral confessions. In much of the
commentary, these so-called confessions are called 'verbals' and the process of producing
them is called 'verballing.' The term 'verballing' refers to the police practice of falsely alleging that an accused has made a verbal confession; this confession is later reduced into a
written police record.").
81. See Drizin & Colgan, supra n. 31, at 341 ("In February 1993, the Chicago Police
Board fired Commander Jon Burge .... For years, suspects and defendants claimed that
Commander Burg, and other officers under his authority, tortured them during interrogations in order to obtain confessions to unsolved homicides .... In 1993 .. .the Chicago
Police Board found credible evidence that torture had occurred and relieved Commander
Burge of his duties."); see also Cassell, supra n. 34, at 554 ("Videotaping creates the possibility of detecting police coercion in forcing suspects to give 'confessions.'... A report in the
American Lawyer describing three false confessions to involvement in the Buddhist temple
murders in Phoenix provides a good example. While tape recorders were running, police
obtained several false confessions in apparent compliance with Miranda .... The tapes
revealed that police had fed information to the suspects, only to have the information fed
back to them later, and that the police had been able to 'tidy up' details in the suspects
'confessions.'"); see also Conti, supra n. 41, at 20; Christopher Slobogin, Tesilying: Police
Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037, 1043 (1996).
82. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor:An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 75, 107 (1992).
83. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
84. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94 (1993).
85. Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894 (2nd Cir. 1988).
86. Id. at 901-02.
87. Id.
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must establish that the police played a role in eliciting the statement
88
before a confession can be found involuntary.
Apart from violating the rights to silence and counsel provided by
the Warren Court in Miranda v. Arizona,8 9 courts have struggled to determine what tactics are sufficiently coercive to render a confession inadmissible. In some cases, determining when police interrogators have
coerced a suspect is clear. For instance, in Brown v. Mississippi,90 the
Supreme Court held that the confessions of three African-American defendants were obtained in violation of due process because they were
91
elicited through the use of lynching, repeated whippings, and torture.
Similarly, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,9 2 the Supreme Court held that the
interrogation of two suspects for thirty six straight hours rendered their
93
confessions involuntary.
In two less clear-cut cases, the Supreme Court excluded confessions
where emotionally unstable and mentally ill suspects were subjected to
over eight hours of interrogation without counsel in Blackburn v. Alabama94 and Spano v. New York. 9 5 However, in similar cases, the court
has used the same totality of the circumstances test, and found that officers did not violate a suspect's due process rights. For instance, in Fare
v. Michael C., 96 the Supreme Court found the confession of an uneducated juvenile admissible even though officers refused his request to
have his probation officer present, used a two-on-one interviewing strategy, interrogated him for a prolonged period, and told him that it would
97
be to his benefit to talk.
One important limitation of the current totality of the circumstances
test is its lack of predictability. Since it is never clear at what point due
process has been violated, the test fails to provide detectives with an incentive to cap their interrogations at eight, twelve or even eighteen
hours. 98 Thus, the totality of the circumstances test may not only increase the rate of false confession, but it could also lead to instances in
88. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).
90. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
91. Id. at 281.
92. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
93. Id. at 154.
94. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
95. Spano v. N.Y., 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959).
96. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
97. Id. at 723-28. Similarly, in Green v. Scully, the Second Circuit found that the defendant spoke voluntarily despite detectives' references to the electric chair and their
phony claims that bloody palm-prints at the crime scene matched his own. 850 F.2d 894,
903 (2nd Cir. 1988).
98. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra n. 54, at 60 (referring to 2004 study which found that
the average length of interrogation leading to false confession was 16.3 hours).
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which the confessions of guilty suspects are needlessly forfeited. As a
potential solution, some legal reformers have called for the creation of
new bright line due process rules akin to the procedures established in
Miranda.
For instance, Rosenberg and Rosenberg argue that all confessions
are compelled and violate due process and the right against self-incrimination.9 9 Although they make several good points, their call for the exclusion of all out of court statements made by suspects has been
criticized as over-broad. 10 0 While it is necessary to ensure that police
officers respect the rights of the accused, it is also important that officers
retain the ability to interrogate suspects. Most confessors are guilty and
a ban on interviews would place an extremely heavy burden on the already thin resources of police and prosecutors.10 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the important role "voluntary"
10 2
confessions serve in the criminal justice system.
Alternatively, Welsh White argues that all statements obtained
through the use of coercive interrogation methods should be excluded on
due process grounds, regardless of the confession's substance or validity.10 3 He suggests a number of measures courts should implement to
protect the rights of the accused including: special restrictions on interrogations of young and mentally handicapped suspects, limits on the duration of interviews, bars on officers lying about incriminating evidence,
04
and a ban on false promises to detained suspects.
Finally, White notes that video cameras may be effective tools in
preventing false confession and enforcing due process safeguards. 0 5 Although many of White's suggestions could have an important impact on
reducing the incidence of false confession,' 0 6 videotaping may be the
only practicable recommendation. Officers and courts may have a diffi99. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposalfor the Abolition
of Custodial Confesssions, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 69 (Nov. 1989).
100. See Corey J. Ayling, CorroboratingConfessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal
Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1121, 1200 (1984) (arguing that
outlawing confessions is too extreme a remedy for the problem of false confession).
101. See Cassell, supra n. 34, at 537-38.
102. See e.g. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (stating "We have previously cautioned against expanding 'currently applicable exclusionary rules by erecting additional barriers to placing truthful and probative evidence before state juries.'").
103. Welsh White, Miranda's Waning Protections 134-55 (U. Mich. Press. 2001)
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Conti, supra n. 41, at 30. (The United Kingdom has adopted some of these proposed reforms. Interrogations are limited to 36 hours, or 96 hours with court approval.
Police must also identify "at risk" individuals including the young, mentally ill and handicapped before interrogation. These suspects can only be interviewed if another "appropriate adult" is present to safeguard the "at risk" individual's rights).
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cult time determining which suspects must be treated exceptionally because of age or mental illness. Similarly, strict rules limiting the amount
of time a suspect can be interviewed and regulating the promises and
threats officers employ may unnecessarily interfere with legitimate interviewing strategies. As the Court noted in Spano, officers may need
more flexibility in questioning suspects in the course of investigating unsolved crimes, than when they are eliciting confessions from indicted
suspects.10 7 If the totality of the circumstances test is abandoned for
more rigid interrogation rules, it is possible that the confessions and convictions of some guilty suspects will be lost.10 8
Unlike White's other recommendations, a mandatory videotaping requirement preserves police discretion and tactical flexibility in the interrogation room. The value of videotape evidence is that it allows courts to
properly assess the totality of the circumstances in which a confession
has been obtained. 10 9 It seems implausible that the susceptibility of the
criminal suspect, the behavior of officers, and the atmosphere in which
an interrogation took place can be accurately determined by judge or jury
absent videotape evidence.
IV.

THE CURRENT STATE OF VIDEO RECORDING IN THE U.S.

A. JuDiciAL APPROACHES
No state or federal court has found that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires police officers to electronically record interrogations. In California v. Trombetta,1 10 the Supreme Court
held that states do not have a due process obligation to preserve exculpatory evidence unless the suspect can prove both that the exculpatory
value of the evidence was apparent before the evidence was destroyed
and the suspect has no alternative evidence available.' 1 1 In Trombetta,
the court argued that although it was feasible to preserve samples of a
drunk driver's breath, the destruction of the samples was not constitutionally material because it was unlikely that the samples would have
provided exculpatory evidence. 112 Every court that has addressed a
mandatory videotaping requirement since has found that the preservation of a recording does not meet the Trombetta materiality test. 1 13
Videotaping of interrogations does not meet the due process materiality
test because criminal suspects always have the opportunity to testify at
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959).
See Cassell, supra n. 34, at 497.
See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94 (1993).
Californiav. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 489-90.
See e.g. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985).
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trial or present evidence that undermines any statements made to police. 1 14 The Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Youngblood,' 1 5
makes the adoption of a recording rule on the basis of the Due Process
Clause even more difficult. In Youngblood, the Court found that not only
must a suspect prove that police failed to preserve material, exculpatory
evidence that could not otherwise be presented at trial, but the suspect
must also prove that the officers' decision to destroy evidence was made
in bad faith. 116 Although no court is likely to find that the federal constitution requires video recording in the near future, courts can still mandate videotaping under state constitutions.
For instance, in Stephan v.State117 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that police officers had a duty to record all custodial interrogations when
conducted in places of detention. 1 18 The court arrived at its decision because it understood that Trombetta did not preclude Alaska from,
"adopt[ing] more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of...
evidence than those imposed by the Federal Constitution." 119 The court
noted an Alaska Court of Appeals decision with facts very similar to
those of Trombetta.120 In the Alaska case, the court held that police of12 1
ficers had a due process obligation to preserve breathalyzer samples.
The court found the parallels between breathalyzer samples and electronic recording compelling and chose to adopt a flexible approach to due
process:
The concept of due process is not static; among other things, it must
change to keep up with new technological developments. For example
the gathering and preservation of breath samples was previously impracticable. Now that this procedure is technologically feasible, many
states require it, either as a matter of due process or by resort to reasoning akin to a due process analysis. The use of audio and video recording
122
is even more commonplace in today's society.
Twenty years later, no other state has found that the due process
rights of suspects require a recording rule. 12 3 Most courts rely on the
114. For example, in Gale v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that the defendant's access to the interviewers notes and opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and
victims provided sufficient due process protection. 792 P.2d 570, 588 (Wyo. 1990).
115. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
116. Id. at 58.
117. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
118. Id. at 1160-61, 1164-65.
119. Id. at 1160.
120. Id. (citing Municipality ofAnchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska App. 1982)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1161-162.
123. See People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 242 (Cal. 1997); People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46, 49
(Colo. App. 1992); State v. James, 678 A.2d 1338, 1360 (Conn. 1996); Coleman v.State, 375
S.E.2d 663 (Ga. App. 1988); State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 746 (Haw. 1994); State v.
Rhoades, 822 P.2d 960, 969 (Idaho 1991); People v. Everette, 543 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (111.
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materiality test in Trombetta and refuse to extend their own due process
clause any further than the federal Constitution. 1 24 At least one other
state, however, has found that videotaping "is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the accused's right to counsel, his right
12 5
against self-incrimination, and ultimately his right to a fair trial."
In 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a recording requirement in State v.Scales.1 2 6 The court rejected the due process approach of Stephan and chose to mandate recording through its
"supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice." 127 The
Minnesota recording rule is ultimately broader than Alaska's rule because it covers all "custodial interrogations." 128 However, failure to record interrogations in Minnesota will only result in suppression of the
statements if the violation is deemed "substantial."12 9 In considering
whether a substantial violation of the rule has occurred, the court looks
to the intent of the officers and the possibility of fabrication. 130 Minnesota's "supervisory" approach to video recording shows promise. Recently, the New Hampshire and Wisconsin Supreme Courts also used
their supervisory powers to implement limited recording requirements in
App. 1st Dist. 1989); Stoker v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1390 (Ind.App. 1998); Baynor v. State, 736
A.2d 325, 332 (Md. 1999); Commonwealth v. Fryar, 610 N.E.2d 903,910 (Mass. 1993); State
v. Buzzell, 617 A.2d 1016, 1018 (Me. 1992); People v. Fike, 577 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. App.
1998); Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1988); Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337,
341 (1989); State v. Cook, 847 A,2d 530 (N.J. 2004); People v. Owens, 713 N.Y.S.2d 452
(2000); State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668, 686 (Ohio 1997); Commonwealth v. Craft, 669 A.2d
394, 397 (Pa. Super. 1995); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 771 (Tenn. 2001); State v.
James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1017-18 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Gorton, 548 A.2d 419, 421 (Vt.
1988); State v.Spurgeon, 820 P.2d 960(Wash. 1991); State v. Kilmer, 439 S.E.2d 881, 894
(W. Va. 1993); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 588 (Wyo. 1990).
124. See e.g. State v. Kilmer, 439 S.E.2d 881, 894 (W. Va. 1993) ("The Appellant recognizes that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Californiav. Trombetta... would not recognize a denial of
due process for the failure of police to record a custodial interrogation. In Trombetta, the
Supreme Court [found] .. .in order to place a constitutional duty upon police to preserve
evidence 'the standard of constitutional materiality" must be met.").
125. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (citing Stephan v. State 711
P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985)).
126. The Minnesota recording requirement entails that, "all custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall
be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at
a place of detention." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 593 ("A violation shall in all cases to be deemed substantial if one or more of
the following paragraphs is applicable ...(a) The violation was gross, willful and prejudicial to the accused . . . (b) The violation was of a kind likely to lead accused persons to
misunderstand their position or legal rights ...(c) ....The violation created a significant
risk that an incriminating statement may have been untrue.").
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State v. Barnett and State v. Jerrell.131 New Hampshire courts now may
only admit into evidence complete recordings of both interrogations and
confessions 1 3 2 This effectively prevents officers from coercing suspects
and then videotaping a resulting confession. 13 3 In Wisconsin, following
Jerrell, all custodial interrogations of juveniles must be videotaped
where feasible, and all interrogations must be videotaped at police stations without exception. 134 While no other court has used its supervisory power to mandate video recording, several courts have indicated
their willingness to impose taping rules.
For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has cited the cost
savings of taping and the need to provide better protections of suspect's
due process rights. 135 Although the court refused to impose a mandatory
videotaping requirement, the court did find that trial courts may con36
sider the absence of an electronic recording in suppression hearings.1
More recently, the high court held that juries could be given cautionary
instructions regarding the voluntariness of a confession where an electronic recording has not been made by police. 13 7 Although many more
courts have also openly acknowledged their support for videotaping interrogations and confessions, 138 they have not adopted video recording
policies. They have argued that creating a new videotaping rule is the
responsibility of state legislatures and have refused to "legislate from the
131. New Hampshire v. Barnett, 147 N.H. 334, 337 (N.H. 2001); State v. Jerrell, 699
N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2005).
132. New Hampshire, 147 N.H. at 337-38 ("We believe both Stephan and Scales, however, by excluding all statements made during unrecorded custodial interrogations (absent
certain narrow exceptions), go too far .... To avoid the inequity inherent in admitting into
evidence the selective recording of a post-Miranda interrogation we establish the following
rule: In order to admit into evidence the taped recording of an interrogation, which occurs
after Miranda rights are given, the recording must be complete... a tape recorded interrogation will not be admitted into evidence unless the statement is recorded in its entirety.").
133. See e.g. Will Taping InterrogationsFix The System? Law Requires Police To Also
Record Questioning, And Some Hope It Prevents False Confessions, Chi. Trib. (June 21,
2005) (describing the wrongful conviction case of Kevin Fox after fourteen hours of interrogation followed by a 20 minute videotaped confession) (available at http://www.nacdl.org/
sl-docs.nsf/freeform/mandatry:008).
134. State v. Jerrel, 699 N.W.2d at 123.
135. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 422 Mass. 269, 272 (Mass. 1996).

136. Id. at 273.
137. See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista,813 N.E.2d 516, 534 (Mass. 2004).
138. See e.g. State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 746 (Haw. 1994) ("Consequently, although
we decline to interpret the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution as requiring that
all custodial interrogations be recorded, we nevertheless stress the importance of utilizing
tape recordings during custodial interrogations when feasible."); State v. Buzzell, 617 A.2d
1016, 1018 (Me. 1992) (holding that the benefits of recording interrogations are "obvious");
State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 771 (Tenn. 2001) ("In light of the slight inconvenience and
expense associated with electronically recording custodial interrogations, sound policy considerations support its adoption as a law enforcement practice.").

788

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

bench."

[Vol. XXIII

139

B.

STATUTORY APPROACHES

140

Texas has the oldest
and perhaps the strictest bar on admission
of uncorroborated oral confessions in the country. 14 1 Since 1981, Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 § 3 has required police officers
to electronically record all custodial interrogations and confessions
before they can be admitted into evidence. 14 2 The statute holds that all
recordings must be intelligible and accurate, operators should be properly trained, prosecutors must send an electronic copy to defense counsel,
43
and all tapes are to be preserved until appeals have been exhausted.'
44
In State v. Lacy,' the court explained the reasoning behind the state's
stringent admissibility standards: "An oral confession of guilt or an oral
admission against interest made by one in custody is inadmissible evidence as the statement is likely to be misunderstood, easily fabricated,
and hard to contradict." 145 Ironically, in nearly every other state, judges
and lawmakers have operated under the opposite, default assumption:
oral confessions are clear evidence of guilt.
Twenty-one different state legislatures and the city council of Washington D.C. have considered legislation mandating video recording of police confessions in the last two years. 146 Illinois, Maine, New Mexico and
Washington D.C. passed recording bills, 1 47 while Florida (twice), Maryland, and Rhode Island rejected electronic recording requirements, and
the New Hampshire legislature deferred to its Supreme Court. 148 Most
139. See State v. Gorton, 548 A.2d 419, 421 (Vt. 1988) ("The most appropriate means of
prescribing rules to augment citizens' due process rights is through legislation ....In the
absence of legislation, we do not believe it appropriate to require, by judicial fiat, that all
statements taken of a person in custody be tape-recorded."); State v. Spurgeon, 820 P.2d
960 (Wash. 1991).
140. See Riley v. State, 4 Tex. Ct. App. 538 (1878); Gay v. State, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 127
(1877).
141. But see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art 38.22 (2004) (Under § 1 police-officers can obtain
signed, written confessions as an alternative to videotaped interrogations and confessions).
142. Id. § 3.
143. Id.
144. State v. Lacy, 80 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. App. 2002).
145. Id. at 209.
146. See Model Legislation, supra n. 19, at 3; see also State Legislative Network, State
Legislation to Require Electronic Recording of Interrogations (available at http://www.
nacdl.org/ sldocs.nsf/freeformlMandatoryStatebyState?OpenDocument).
147. Ill. Sen. 15, 93d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2003); 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 801-A
(2004); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-14-4.5 (2005); D.C. Code Ann. § 5-133.20 (Lexis 2003).
148. Fla Sen. 2752, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess.; Fla. H. 1119, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (available
at http.//www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2005/Housebills/billtext/pdf/hlll90.pdf); Md. H.
387, 2003 Leg., 416th Sess (available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2003rs/billfile/hb0387.htm);
R.I. S. 350, 2003 Gen. Assem. § 1 (5)(b).
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of the proposals base their recording rule on Stephan v. State14 9 and confine videotaping to places of detention including station houses, correctional facilities, and courthouses. 150 The Oregon and Washington bills,
however, provide that police officers cannot evade recording requirements by intentionally interrogating criminal suspects offsite.1 5 1
Most of the bills fail to specify when or how videotaping should be
implemented, but a few are very specific. For instance, Illinois, Kentucky, and Maine legislators limited their recording requirements to interrogations of homicide and sex crime suspects, 15 2 Arizona's bill only
considers juvenile suspects, 153 and Connecticut, Georgia, New Mexico,
Washington, Missouri, and Louisiana legislators apply their videotaping
15 4
rule only to felony cases.
Several New York proposals and the Illinois bill recognize that
training officers will be a vital part of any recording policy,' 5 5 and the
Louisiana bill specifies that all recordings must become a part of the
public record. 156 Nearly every bill also creates a number of "good cause"
exceptions by which the recording requirement will be excused.' 5 7 The
most common good cause exception is an exemption akin to that found in
Minnesota's recording rule, which permits officers to dodge recording
15 8
rules where it would not be "feasible."
Although all the bills seek to protect the rights of criminal suspects
to a certain extent, legislators use vastly different arguments to frame
149. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
150. The Connecticut, illinois, Maryland, New York, and Tennessee bills do not require
videotaping of interviews outside the confines of the police station.
151. See Or. S. 265, 73d Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (2005) (available at http://landru.leg.
state.or.us/05reg/measures/sb0200.dir/sb0265.intro.html); see also Wash. H. 1932, 58th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (2003).
152. Ill. S. 15, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2003); Ky. H. 242, 2005 Reg. Sess.; Me.
L.D. 891, 121st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (2004).
153. Ariz. H. 2614, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2005).
154. See e.g. Ct. S. 1281, Gen. Assembly (2005) (available at http://search.cga.state.ct.
us/2005frOB/s/pdf/2005SB-01281-ROO-SB.pdf).
155. Il. S. 15, 93d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2003); N.Y. A. 6541, 2005 Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (2005) (available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06541); N.Y. A. 7947, 2005
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2005) (available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A07947&sh
=t); N.Y. S. 1036, 2005 Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2005) (available at http://assembly.state.ny.
us/leg/?bn=S01036&sh=t); N.Y. S. 3354, 2005 Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2005) (available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=S3354&sh=t).
156. La. S. 734, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., (available at http://www.legis.state.la.us
leg-.docs/04RS/CVT9/OUT/000OL6DI.PDF).
157. See e.g. Ga. H. 1395, 2003-2004 Sess. (2004); Tenn. S. 108, H. 204, 104th Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2005) (available at httpJ/www.legislature.state.tn.us/bills/currentga/BILIJSBO108.pdf). Some of these exceptions include: exigent circumstances, equipment failure, eavesdropping, voluntary confessions, suspect's refusal to be taped, or a
statement elicited out of state or by a federal agent.
158. See Me. L.D. 891, 121st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (2004).
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their proposals. For instance, the Oregon bill emphasizes that statements made by defendants during custodial interrogations are inadmissible unless they fall into one of the bill's exceptions. 15 9 By contrast, the
2003 Florida proposal framed the recording requirement as a cost effective solution that will improve the criminal justice system:
[L]ow cost technology is now available in every jurisdiction to record
each custodial interrogation of a criminal suspect, eliminating this
and enhancing the reliability and reputation of
gross waste of resources
160
law enforcement.
Of the fourteen bills that remain in consideration, many appear viable. State representatives reintroduced the Nebraska bill on January
2005.161 As of late 2005, committees are also reviewing recording bills in
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, New
York, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.1 6 2 These have the greatest potential to become law, but all the bills may need substantial revision to specify how the policies will be funded and implemented
C.

LOCAL APPROACHES

In addition to movement among state legislatures for more uniform
recording requirements, hundreds of local and state police agencies have
1 63
already voluntarily adopted video recording rules for interrogations.
As a matter of department policy, officers routinely record station house
confessions in Minneapolis, San Antonio, Miami, Denver, Houston, San
Diego, Chicago, and St. Louis. 16 4 Videotaping policies vary considerably
159. Or. S. 265, 73d Leg. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2005), (available at http://landru.leg.
state.or.us/05reg/measures/sb0200.dir/sb0265.intro.html) ("Requires that statement[s]
made by defendant during custodial interrogation be recorded electronically to be admissible as evidence against defendant. Provides exceptions.").
160. Fla. S. 2752, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess.
161. Neb. L.B. 112, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2005) (available at http://www.unicam.state.
ne.us/pdf/INTROLB112.pdf).
162. See Ct. S. 1281, Gen. Assembly (2005) (available at http://search.cga.state.ct.us/
2005/ TOB/s/pdff2005SB-01281-ROO-SB.pdf); Mo. H. 557, 93rd Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(2005), (available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/05info/house/billtext/intro/hb0557i.htm);
N.Y. S. 3354, 2005 Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2005), (available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/
leg/?bn=S03354&sh=t.; Tenn. S. 108, H. 204, 104th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2005)
(available at http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/bills/currentga/BILL/SB0108.pdf).
163. N.M. H. Appropriations Comm., Fiscal Impact Report on Custodial Interrogation
Recordings, 549, Reg. Sess. (2003) (available at http://legis.state.nm.us/lissearch.html).
164. See Thomas P. Sullivan & Laura A. Thomas, Electronic Recording of Interrogations, in Recording of Custodial Interrogations: A Resource Guide, 1-6 (Innocence Project,
New York, N.Y. June 6, 2003) (including a sampling of municipal/county police departments that routinely videotape station-house interrogations include: San Diego (Cal.),
Boulder, Colorado Springs, Denver, Fort Collins (Colo.), New Haven (Conn.), Coral Springs
(Fla.), DuPage County, Kanakee County, Peoria (Ill.), Portland (Me.), Prince George's
County (Md.), Las Cruces (N.M.), Sioux City, Aberdeen (S.D.), Austin (Tex.); see also Geller,
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among departments. The Portland, Maine, and Aberdeen, South Dakota, police departments have two of the most stringent recording policies in the country.1 6 5 The Portland police department requires
videotaping of all stationhouse interrogations and confessions, while Aberdeen officers routinely audiotape or videotape all suspect
16 6
statements.
Most municipal police policies are far less strict. In Miami, recordings are only made in serious cases and officers are under no duty to
record statements made at the scene or in patrol cars.1 6 7 San Diego,
Boulder, Sioux City, Las Cruces, and Prince George's County detectives
record tape suspect interviews in only serious felony cases.' 68 New
York, Chicago, and Philadelphia officers typically only record the confessions of the accused, rather than entire interrogations. 16 9 The Houston,
Austin and Los Angeles police departments allow officers complete dis170
cretion to decide whether or not they will record suspect statements.
Many more police departments have no official recording policy, but police officers still choose to record their interactions with suspects to pro171
tect themselves and preserve evidence.
V.

CONFESSIONS OUTSIDE THE STATIONHOUSE

Both criminal suspects and the police stand to gain tremendously
from a recording rule that extends beyond the interrogation room. If recording policies draw a distinction between the station house and other
interrogation sites, officers may find ways to subvert the recording requirement when it suits their interests. And even in air-tight cases, the
supra n. 2, at 2. Other police departments using recording include Fort Wayne (Ind.),
Houston (Tex.), Orange County (Cal.), St. Louis (Mo.), Kansas City (Mo.), Tulsa (Okla.),
and the Bronx (N.Y.)).
165. PortlandPolice Department StandardOperatingProcedure,in Recording of Custodial Interrogations: A Resource Guide (Innocence Project, New York, N.Y. June 6, 2003);
Sullivan & Thomas, supra n. 165, at 3.
166. Id.
167. Shaila K. Dewan, New York Police Department Bucks a Growing Trend, N.Y.P.D.
News (Sept. 2, 2003) (available at http://www.nypdnews.com/90203taping.html).
168. Sullivan & Thomas, supra n. 165, at 1-6.
169. Mark Fazlollah, More and More Convictions Come Undone, Phila. Inquirer (Feb.
24, 2003) (available at http://www.truthinjustice.org/unraveling.htm).
170. Sullivan & Thomas, supra n. 165, at 4-6; S.K. Bardwell, HPD Has No Policy on
Taping, Houston Chron. S5 (Feb. 27, 2002).
171. See e.g. Carlos Sadovi, Cops Use Cameras to Fight Brutality Claims, Chi. SunTimes 5 (Jan. 16, 2003) (In Chicago, many police officers have begun carrying their own
personal video cameras with them to protect against accusations of police brutality. In one
case, a Chicago detective video recorded the suspect and the scene of an arrest. Later,
when the suspect filed a $21 million police brutality suit, the officer had evidence directly
contradicting the abuse charges. Ironically, officers can be suspended for creating these
tapes).
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absence of testamentary evidence from interviews conducted in the back
of patrol cars, at crime scenes, in suspects' homes, and on the street will
1 72
raise the suspicions and doubts of judges and juries.
Although Paul Cassell's Salt Lake City study indicates that suspects
facing interrogation outside police stations may be less likely to confess, 17 3 in some situations, these suspects may be more susceptible to
psychological coercion. 1 74 A suspect caught at the scene of the crime,
guilty or innocent, may feel an overbearing sense of guilt or pressure to
confess. 17 5 With freedom close at hand suspects may also believe that
officers will let them go if they "come clean." Officers can also easily recreate the coercive atmosphere of an interrogation room by interrogating
1 76
suspects in isolated, private places for interminable periods of time.
In jurisdictions that only require station house taping, officers have
flouted recording rules by conducting interrogations in police cars, on the
street and, in at least one instance, a motel room.17 7 The circumvention
of recording requirements has been a predictable result of the limited
application of the recording requirement to interrogations conducted in
places of"detention."1 78 Unlike the broader concept of "custodial interrogation" which covers all instances in which a suspect has been arrested
or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom, 1 79 "detention" typi172. See State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 746 (Haw. 1994); Andrew Smith, Interrogating
Under Video's Watchful Eye, Newsday A29 (Apr. 30, 2003) (noting Prosecutor Collins
claims, "You can rest assured that if none of these things are happening under the watchful
eye of the camera, there will be allegations that they happened before or after . . . the
videotaping.").
173. See Cassell, supra n. 34, at 509.
174. See supra Part II.
175. Id.
176. See Dennis Payne, Police Liability 199-201 (2002) (recounting the case of a defendant brought to trial for the death of his girlfriend's four-year-old child. Detectives interrogated the suspect at his apartment for four hours. Although they told him he was not
under arrest and did not read him his Miranda rights, four detectives interrogated him;
they refused to allow him to speak to his wife or father or obtain a glass of water. Subsequently, after being taken to the station house and receiving the Miranda warning, the
suspect gave a thirty-two minute interview in which he admitted to playing a role in the
child's death).
177. See Shindle v. State, 731 P.2d 582 (Alaska App. 1987).
178. See e.g. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985) (stating "Today, we
hold that an unexcused failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted
in a place of detention violates a suspect's right to due process, under the Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus obtained is generally inadmissible.").
179. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-99 (1980) ("That is to say, the term
'interrogation' under Mirandarefers not only to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.").
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cally encompasses only those interviews conducted in police stations or
jails.18 0
In Stephan v. State' 8 ' the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the
perverse incentives it was creating by restricting the scope of its constitutionally mandated recording requirement:
We recognize that many custodial interrogations must take place in the
field, where recording may not be feasible. Because of this, the rule
that we announce today has limited application; it applies only to custodial interrogations conducted in a place of detention, such as a police
station or jail, where it is reasonable to assume that recording equipment is available... In a future case, however, we may be persuaded to
extend the application of this rule, particularly if it appears that law
to circumvent the
enforcement officials are engaging in bad faith efforts
82
recording requirement set forth in the opinion.
Shindle v. Alaska,'8 3 presented the Alaska Court of Appeals with a
clear instance of the type of "bad faith" foreseen by the Stephan court.
Police videotaped the arrest of Shindle on suspicion of drug possession at
a motel and then turned the camera off.' 8 4 Fifty minutes later Shindle
waived his Fourth Amendment rights and allowed officers to conduct
warrantless searches of his house and truck.' 8 5 Ironically, despite the
availability of a videocamera, the court denied Shindle's motion to suppress self-incriminating statements. The court reasoned that the motel
did not constitute "a place of detention" and Alaska's video recording
mandate was therefore inapplicable.' 8 6 Even more incredibly, the court
ruled that the fifty-minute conversation held in a motel room, while police officers detained Shindle and allegedly threatened to seize his8 truck
7
and arrest his girlfriend, was not even a custodial interrogation.1
Although Minnesota's recording rule is stronger because it necessitates videotaping of all custodial interrogations, the rule's feasibility and
"substantial violation"' 8 8 exceptions similarly allow officers to easily
avoid taping. For instance, in Minnesota v. Schroeder,'8 9 an appellate
court found that a criminal defendant could not suppress unrecorded
custodial statements made in the back of a police car.' 90 Both officers in
180. See e.g. Tenn. H. 1138, 103rd Gen. Assembly., Reg. Sess. (2003) ("'Place of detention' means a facility under the control of law enforcement.").
181. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
182. Id. at 1165, n. 33.
183. Shindle v. State, 731 P.2d 582 (Alaska App. 1987).
184. Id. at 583.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 584.
187. Id. at 584-85.
188. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
189. State v. Schroeder, 560 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. App. 1997).
190. Id. at 739-40.
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the car had tape-recorders, but they claimed that neither device was
functional. 19 1 The court found that the failure of officers to record the
interrogation was not a "substantial violation" of the recording rule because the suspect was apprised of his Miranda rights and spoke voluntarily.19 2 It was not feasible, the court held, to expect officers to have
193
working audio-recorders in the back of patrol cars.
As cameras become more widely available, videotaping is now possi19 4
ble on the street, in the back of patrol cars, and in suspects' homes.
While Alaska and Minnesota have gone further than most states in protecting the rights of suspects, their reluctance to effectively extend the
recording rule outside the stationhouse undermines their video-recording rules. In the interrogation room the suspect is isolated, alone, and
under the complete authority of police officers. 1 95 But is not the same
also true in a locked motel room or in the back of a patrol car en route to
jail? Courts do not draw an artificial distinction between the station
house and the patrol car in requiring delivery of the Miranda warning.1 96 Regardless of where a suspect has been taken into custody, he
must waive his Mirandarights or the ensuing interrogation is inadmissible. If cheap and easy-to-operate electronic recording devices have made
videotaping feasible outside of the station house, it makes little sense for
courts and legislatures to afford suspects one constitutional protection in
the back of a patrol car while neglecting other, recognized constitutional
rights.
Patrol car and officer-mounted cameras are the natural extension of
any recording policy. In some instances it is necessary or preferable for
officers to conduct interviews or interrogations outside the station house.
Particularly when the officer needs vital information to thwart a crime in
progress, time may not allow the officer to take the suspect to the station
house for a lengthy interrogation. An officer may also justifiably believe
that a suspect may be more willing to talk in his own home, hospital
room, or on the street corner. Allowing officers access to mobile technologies lets the officer use her discretion and judgment in choosing when
191. Id. at 740.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 740-41. Of course, even if the Minnesota and Alaskan courts did require the
videotaping of all custodial interrogations, officers could still potentially skirt videotaping
rules by interviewing suspects before they are taken into custody. State v. Conger, 652
N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn. 2002) ("Fox intentionally did not record Conger's interview, though
equipment was available. He said he chose not to record the interview because Conger was
not in custody, and because 'sometimes people talk more freely when they don't have a
little red light on a tape recorder sitting on the table in front of them.'").
194. See infra Part VI.

195. See Gudjonnson, supra n.29, at 26.
196. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Jones, 677 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. App. 1997); State v. Jua-

rez, 903 P.2d 241 (N.M. App. 1995); Santos v. Bayley, 400 F. Supp. 784 (D.C. Pa. 1975).
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and where to conduct an interview. Video cameras or even tape-recorders preserve a valuable record of suspect's statements in context and
197
reduces admissibility disputes.
VI.

THE FEASIBILITY OF A BROADER
RECORDING REQUIREMENT
A.

VIDEO CAMERAS IN POLICE CARS

Video cameras in every police car in America may soon be a reality.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police estimates that the number of police cars equipped with video cameras has surged from one in
ten to nearly half.198 As of 2000, every state police agency made some
use of video cameras in patrol cars. 199 If cameras are already present in
police cars, it is only logical that they should be used to videotape suspect
interrogations and confessions. Recent camera technologies now make it
possible for most cameras to be adjusted to record events both inside and
outside of the police car. Some systems even include back-seat microphones to more accurately capture suspects' statements. 20 0 Most in car
recording systems allow for continuous taping for an entire twelve-hour
shift and many include remote operation features and officer-mounted
201
microphones.
Local concerns about abusive police behaviors including the excessive use of force, dangerous police pursuits, and abuse of detained sus20 2
pects have driven many police agencies to install these cameras.
Sixty-two percent of local police departments with more than 100 officers
now equip their cars with cameras. 20 3 After state troopers shot three
suspects on the New Jersey turnpike in 1998, Governor Christie Whit197. Paul Cassell, Miranda'sSocial Costs:An EmpiricalReassessment, in The Miranda
Debate 231 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III ed., 1998) [hereinafter "Cassell,
Empirical"].
198. See Candice Combs, Cameras Go on Patrolwith ChattanoogaPolice, Chattanooga
Times B1 (Aug. 27, 2003).
199. See Schwabe, Davis & Jackson, supra n. 8, at 107.
200. Brooke A. Masters, For Drunk Drivers in Alexandria, Playback Time: Police Test
Cameras To Bolster Evidence, Wash. Post T03 (Mar. 22, 2001).
201. Id.
202. See Barnhardt, supra n. 24; Patrick McMahon, Increased Clamor for Cameras in
Cop Cars, USA Today (July 18, 2002) (available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/
2002/07/19/ copcameras.htm); Glenn Puit, Cost Makes Video Cameras Long Shot for Police,
Las Vegas Rev. J. (Feb. 9, 1999) (available at httpJ/www.reviewjournal.conlvrj_home/
1999/Feb-09-Tue-1999/news/10542203.html) ("In the Las Vegas Valley, community concern
about police misconduct has sparked a movement to create a citizens review board that will
police the police.").
203. But see, U.S. Dept. of J., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement and Management Statistics: Local Law Enforcement 2000, 27 NCJ 196002 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter
"Law Enforcement Statistics"].
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man mandated cameras in all state police cars. 20 4 In Maryland, a recent
judicial consent decree stemming from a racial-profiling suit requires the
state to install as many video cameras in patrol cars as the state budget
will allow. 20 5 In South Dakota, the highway patrol does not have a camera in every car, but all highway patrol officers are equipped with tape
recorders and must tape every suspect interview conducted in patrol
cruisers. 20 6 The city of Seattle has equipped a number of its police cars
with cameras 20 7 and hundreds of other municipal departments are either installing cameras or seeking funding for recording equipment. 20 8
Although the extent of recording varies by department and the largest
police departments have had difficulty installing cameras in their
cars, 20 9 the number of video-capable cars should continue to increase.
B.

A UNIVERSAL

RECORDING REQUIREMENT

Police use of portable cameras is difficult to calculate, but sixty
seven percent of police agencies serving jurisdictions of more than a mil2 10
lion people currently possess mobile surveillance video technology.
Mobile electronic recording equipment is often far cheaper and more
readily available than expensive interrogation room cameras or sophisticated police cruiser taping systems. 2 1 1 Although hand-held cameras can
be unwieldy and heavy, 21 2 technological solutions are available. Handsfree, wireless, voice-activated and miniaturized technologies 2 13 may allow officers the flexibility and freedom of movement to record interactions with suspects even in dangerous situations. Courts and
204. McMahon, supra n. 202.
205. Barnhardt, supra n. 24.
206. U.S. v Azure, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22319 (S.D. 1999) (containing an order suppressing suspect statement, reports, transcripts, and exhibits).
207. McMahon, supra n. 202.
208. See Law Enforcement Statistics, supra n. 204.
209. See id (noting that only 13 percent of municipal departments serving populations
of more than 250,000 have installed video-cameras in patrol cars); See also Schwabe, Davis
& Jackson, supra n. 8, at 107.
210. Id.
211. Portable video cameras can cost as little as $150. Interrogation room and patrol
car camera systems cost a minimum of several thousand dollars. See infra nn. 227, 229.
212. If officers are required to devote their attention to equipment, they maybe vulnerable to attack from the suspect or a third party. If a police officer's hands are on the camera she may not be able to quickly obtain access to her gun or mace.
213. See Combs, supra n. 199, at B1 (noting that camera microphones attach to officer
uniforms and cameras in car can be remotely operated); Paul Eng, Third Eye Not-So Blind,
http://printerfriendly.abc.news.com/printerfriendly/Print?fetchFromGLUE=true
(Sept. 30,
2003) (Reporting the development of $300-$500 miniature cameras that can be attached to
clothing that will be marketed to police departments); See also Mark Bassett, Deja View
Debuts Wearable Camcorder, http://www.camcorderinfo.com/content/deja-view-debutswearable-camcorder-ll_09_03.htm (accessed May 5, 2004).
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legislatures may also consider "exigent" or "emergency circumstances"
214
clauses that provide limited exceptions to mandatory recording rules.
To make recording more convenient many recording policies also provide
that when an interview is conducted outside the station house, audiotaping alone is sufficient. 2 15 If recording policies allow the use of tape recorders, cost, safety, and technology concerns may become virtual nonissues. Of course, as the quality and availability of video camera technology continues to improve, police departments should keep pace with
developments.
VII.

OBJECTIONS TO POLICE RECORDING REQUIREMENTS
A.

FUNDING CONCERNS

The most frequently cited objection to video taping interrogations is
the cost. 2 16 Indeed, the costs of installing video equipment, training
staff to use the equipment, and storing and transcribing videotapes can
be prohibitive. 217 Moreover, the additional administrative and transaction costs of admitting videotape evidence into courtrooms may also deter potential proponents. Nonetheless, as technology continues to
improve and becomes cheaper and easier to use, video cameras become a
more viable proposition. Basic stationhouse and handheld video cameras can now be purchased for as little as one hundred fifty dollars, and
sophisticated recording equipment can be obtained for a few thousand
dollars. 2 18 Detectives in Kankakee, Illinois, equipped an interrogation
room with video equipment for only $5,000.219 Patrol car camera systems can cost anywhere from $1,500 to $10,000 per car, but the market
for patrol car video systems is competitive. 2 20 A typical system, mar214. See supra n. 153.
215. DuPage County Sheriff, Detective Division, CriminalInvestigations:Recording Interviews, in Recording of Custodial Interrogations: A Resource Guide (Innocence Project,
New York, N.Y. June 6, 2003).
216. McGuire, supra n. 22, at 1C. (stating Chicago Mayor Daly squelched a proposed
ordinance requiring videotaping of all interrogations, calling it too costly).
217. Id. (stating Broward County prosecutors estimate that equipping three rooms with
video cameras will cost $17,500, and training officers to use the equipment will be an additional $7,000. The chief cost, however, will be transcribing anywhere from 58,000 to
230,000 pages of testimony per year at an average of $4.90 to $14 per page).
218. See No More Excuses, C6; see also Brian Moore, Shepherdsville UpgradesEvidence
Tracking;Police also Improve Setup for Interviews, Courier J. 1H (Nov. 19, 2003). (stating
that the Shepherdsvillle police department bought a video surveillance system that allows
supervisors in three different offices to simultaneously view an ongoing interrogation).
219. Ill. H., Task Force on Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, Statement of
Chief of Police for Kankakee City Police Dept., Bill Doster (July 23, 1999).
220. See McMahon, supra n. 202 at 3A, but see Barnhardt, supra n. 24. (reporting that
the estimated cost of equipping Maryland patrol cars is $55,000-$65,000. It seems likely
that she has erred).
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keted by Kustom Signals, costs about $4,500 and comes with a high-resolution digital camera and voice-command features. 22 1 In comparison,
DuPage County, Illinois paid out $3.5 million in its settlement in the
false confession of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez and Cook
222
County paid $38.5 million after it released the Ford Heights Four.
Facing the costs of multi-million dollar false conviction and civil rights
suits; videotaping might be the cheaper alternative for many embattled
police departments.
Some seventy percent of police agencies already have video recording equipment. 223 Although some of this equipment is obsolete and may
be ill suited to record interrogations, 2 24 police agencies can obtain funding from national, state, and local sources. For instance, in 2002, the
National Institute of Justice had a budget of over $178 million to develop
police technology and provide grants to local law enforcement agencies. 2 2 5 Congress has earmarked an additional $100 million for technology development through the COPS Technology program since 1999.226
Government grants for cameras in patrol cars are widely available.
Since 2000, the Community Oriented Policing Services' In-Car Camera
Grant Program has provided $21 million in funding to install cameras in
over 5,000 patrol cars in 49 states and the District of Columbia. 22 7 In
2003, the program provided $3.2 million to 21 states for an additional
747 cameras. 228 COPS also provided training to grantees through its
Law Enforcement Mobile Video Institute ("LEMVI") on issues including
229
racial profiling, police brutality, civil rights, and police accountability.
221. See Police In-Car Company Directory, www.policeone.com/police-products/vehicleequipment/in-car-video/manufacturers (Jan. 18, 2004) (listing seventeen different police
car, camera manufacturers including: CruiseCam, Decateur Electronics, Kustom Signals,
MPH, Inc., Martel Electronics, Stalker Radar, ESA, International Police Technologies,
L&E Mobile Computers & Mounts, Inc., and MPD, Inc).
222. See No More Excuses, supra n. 218, at C6.
223. Schwabe, Davis & Jackson, supra n. 8, at xvii.
224. Id.
225. U.S. Census Bureau, Consolidated Fed. Funds Report: Fiscal Year 2002, Office of
Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice Research, Evaluation& Development Project Grants (2003).
226. Schwabe, Davis & Jackson, supra n. 8 at 121. (stating that although most federal
money is earmarked for particular programs, up to 30 percent remains for grant programs
and discretionary use).
227. U.S. Dept. of J., Community Oriented Policing Service, COPS In-Car Grant Program, COPS Fact Sheet (2003) (available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf.iItem
=746) [hereinafter COPS, 2003].
228. U.S. Dept. of J., Community Oriented Policing Service, COPS In-Car Camera
Grant Announcement (2002) (available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?.Item=
743).
229. See COPS, 2003, supra n. 227.
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In 2000-2001, 79 percent of police departments serving populations
of more than 225,000 received federal funding for technology acquisition
(97 percent of those that requested it). 230 Although rural and small urban police departments had far less success in obtaining federal grants,
59 percent of rural police departments that requested funding received
it. 2 3 1 Many of these technology grants were extremely generous. In
2003, the Office of Community Oriented Policing provided technology
grants of $1,996,000 to the Orange County, California, Sheriffs Department, $2,980,500 to the Milwaukee Police Department, and $1,975,317
23 2
to the Texas Law Enforcement Mobile Video Institute.
In addition to federal grants, state and local funding are also critical
resources for local police departments. 2 33 Recording equipment may be
bought in bulk at relatively low cost through cooperative purchasing
agreements. 234 By banding together several local departments in a
county or small state, with similar budgets and needs, can split the costs
of researching, testing, and buying recording equipment. 2 35
Even in large cities, videotaping is now a viable option for most police departments. William Geller reported that the average length of an
interrogation is only 2-4 hours, 23 6 and Richard Leo reported that over 70
percent of the interviews he observed lasted less than one hour. 23 7 Although transcription and storage costs potentially comprise the largest
portion of videotaping costs, these costs can be allayed through careful
cataloging of tapes, use of digital technologies, 2 38 and carefully scheduled destructions of recordings. 239 Departments may also cut costs by
limiting recording requirements to cases involving violent felonies. 240
230. Schwabe, Davis & Jackson, supra n. 8 at 135.
231. Id.
232. See COPS, 2003, supra n. 227.
233. See e.g. Moore supra n. 218 at 1H. (stating that the Shepherdsville, Kentucky police department funded a station house recording system largely through a $6,000 donation
from a local charity).
234. Schwabe, Davis & Jackson, supra n. 8, at xxiv.
235. Id.
236. Geller, supra n. 2, at 4.
237. Leo, Inside, supra n. 67, at 279.
238. See No More Excuses, supra n. 218 at C6. (noting that thanks to digital technology,
the Kanakee County Sheriffs Department stored 157 videotapes on one small bookshelf in
the station house).
239. All tapes in homicide cases should be preserved indefinitely. Tapes in all other
cases may be destroyed after exhaustion of appeals or after the statute of limitations has
expired.
240. See Drizin & Colgan, supra n. 31 at 406 (Limiting videotaping to cases involving
violent felonies would be a purely cost saving device. To prevent officers from erring on the
side of under inclusion and failing to record interrogations of suspects accused of violent
felonies, a recording rule might place a bar on the entry into evidence of all confessions
elicited from such suspects unless it was not reasonably apparent at the time of arrest that
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Many police departments already use selective video recording to cut
costs. Geller found that video-equipped police agencies recorded interrogations of 81 percent of homicide suspects, 77 percent of accused rapists,
and 71 percent of aggravated battery and assault suspects, but only 44
percent of burglary suspects and 34 percent of suspects accused of other
241
property crimes.
B.

THE "CHILLING EFFECT"

Another frequently cited objection to electronic recording is the potential "chilling-effect" it will have on suspects.2 4 2 Some 28.3 percent of
police agencies in Geller's National Institute of Justice study believed
that suspects were somewhat less willing to talk on tape. 24 3 The fear
that a suspect will refuse to speak in the presence of a recording device
may be linked to standard police interrogation texts indicating that recording is undesirable. For example, Inbau, Reid & Buckley stress the
need for complete isolation of the suspect and argue that any distraction
will shift the balance of power between suspect and interrogator and reduce the likelihood of a successful interrogation. 24 4 They strongly oppose videotaping because they believe it will reduce the number of
24 5
confessions officers obtain.
For the most part, however, empirical evidence indicates that recordings have no impact on the likelihood of confession. Both Geller's
study and a second study in Canada reveal that suspects are no less
likely to confess in the presence of an electronic recording device. 24 6 Additionally, a third study found that electronic recording did not interfere
with police officer's use of standard interrogation techniques. 24 7 Althey had committed a violent felony. By applying this reasonableness standard, the court
could insure that officers erred on the side of over-caution in recording suspect interviews
where they were not sure if the suspect had committed a violent felony).
241. Geller, supra n. 2, at 3.
242. See OLR Research Report, supra n. 199 ("Several [Connecticut] police chiefs revealed strong views against videotaping interrogations. Some said that suspects would be
reluctant to talk with a video camera rolling since they knew everything they said would be
recorded and heard in court."); Arthur Santana, D.C. Council to Consider Police Interrogation Bill, Wash. Post B02 (Nov. 30, 2002). (D.C. Police Chief Ramsey expressed his disagreement with a city council interrogation bill claiming, "Some interviews might be done at
a person's home. It does have a chilling effect on witnesses who want to provide information who might otherwise have provided information if it weren't on tape."); Smith, supran.
173.
243. Cassell, Lost Confessions, supra n. 34, at 555.
244. See Inbau, Reid & Buckley, supra n. 68, at 177.
245. Id.
246. See Geller, supra n. 2, at 6; Cassell, Empirical, supra n. 197, at 181 (noting Alan
Grant study in which it was found that videotaping did not reduce the confession rate and
only 4.8 percent of Canadian suspects refused to have their interrogations videotaped).
247. Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 39 (referring to Willis, Macleod & Nash study).
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though police officers and prosecutors may fear that jurors will condemn
many of the psychological ploys caught on tape, this has not proven to be
24 8
the case.
C.

PRIVACY CONCERNS

In addition to cost concerns, many officers dislike video cameras because they believe cameras pose a threat to their independence and exercise of discretion. Peter Manning notes that many officers view the
camera as an intrusive, "big brother." 24 9 Officers may fear that videotaping interrogations will raise the expectations and demands made by
supervisors. If a recording indicates that an officer chose to let a guilty
suspect free, the officer could face formal or informal sanctions. If supervisors use videotape in this way it could increase the pressure officers
feel to make arrests they believe are unnecessary or unproductive. Constant monitoring of an officer's interactions with suspects could increase
stress levels and may even reduce officer performance. 250 Officers may
also feel violated if cameras record continuously and capture every personal break or conversation.
If such feelings are strong enough, officers may misuse or even sabotage video-recording equipment. 25 1 Manning remarks that of all the
technologies found within patrol cars, officers are most likely to tamper
with video recording equipment: "These cameras . . .can be shaped to
officers' routines." 25 2 Cameras are frequently switched off, not to hide
abusive or immoral conduct, but merely to allow officers the opportunity
to relax and avoid censure for an offhand comment or extra long
break. 25 3 Sensibly crafted video-recording rules may ease officer's
qualms about videotaping. Interrogation room and patrol car systems
that can be turned on and off may be preferable to continuous recording
systems. As long as officers are reprimanded for failures to record "custodial interrogations," police departments may allow officers some dis248. Geller, supra n. 2, at 6. Short of physical abuse or prolonged psychological coercion, jurors are likely to accept most police interrogation techniques as standard operating
procedure. See No More Excuses, supra n. 218, at C6.
249. See Peter Manning, Policing Contingencies 120-21 (2003); Reid R. Frazier, Cameras Set to be Installed in Five Shaler Police Cruisers,Trib. Rev. (Dec. 8, 2003) (available at
www.pittsburghlive.comx/tribune-review/tribnorth/news/s-168905.html).
("Mannell said
he was uncomfortable with some types of video cameras that are on from the time the key
is turned in a car's ignition. 'If you have them .... running all the time, you're turning
(into) Big Brother.'").
250. John E. Eck, Alternative Futuresfor Policing,Police Innovation and Control of the
Police 71 (David Weisburd & Craig Uchida eds. 1993).
251. Manning, supra n. 249, at 155.
252. Id. (describing a ride-along with the LAPD, Manning noted that the very first
thing the officer did was to disable the 12-hour video camera).
253. Id. at 163.
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cretion in the use of recording equipment. If officers accept video
cameras as a policing tool, rather than as an imposition, videotaping policies will ultimately be more effective.
D.

TECHNOLOGY CONCERNS

Critics may cite technical problems as an important reason to shy
away from any mandatory taping requirement. 2 54 During videotaping
vital testimony may be lost because interviewee and interrogator interrupt one-another. Microphones may not pick-up the voices of suspects
speaking in low tones, rapidly, or slurring their speech, and background
noises may drown-out critical testimony. 2 5 5 Additionally, raw videotape
may include testimony that is inadmissible on evidentiary grounds, forcing the court to become a video-editor and leaving the jury with a perplexing and incomplete version of the interrogation. 2 56 Lastly, videorecording equipment may malfunction and may not be operable at the
time of the interrogation or video-recordings may be unintentionally
25 7
erased.
While these concerns are legitimate, many are easily resolved
through adequate technology training and operation guidelines. Although only about one of three police departments currently receive federal technological support, several federal agencies, including Law
Enforcement Online ("LEO") and the National Law Enforcement and
Corrections Technology Centers, are readily available sources for technology advice and training.2 5 8 If police officers and detectives are properly trained to use recording equipment they are much more likely to
record complete and accurate interrogations. Proper placement of the
suspect and interrogator and calibration of the equipment can resolve
many audibility problems. In stationhouse interrogations; it may be possible for supervisors to monitor interviews, in separate rooms, as the interrogation proceeds. 2 59 Thus, even if an interrogating officer is not
aware that the recording is inaudible, a supervisor watching the taping
260
can intervene and make the necessary audio and video adjustments.
254. Inbau, Reid & Buckley, supra n. 68, at 177-78.
255. Id.
256. See e.g. Lanham v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-SC-0268, 2005 WL 2043703 (Ky.
2005) (addressing whether part of electronically recorded interrogation must be redacted as
prejudicial to defendant).
257. Id.
258. See Schwabe, Davis & Jackson, supra n. 8, at xxiii-xxiv.
259. See Portland,supra n. 165.
260. See e.g. DuPage County Sheriff, supra n. 215 (noting that the DuPage County
Sheriff assigns a second detective to monitor all videotaping to ensure that the tape does
not run out).
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If a police officer discovers that her recording equipment is inoperable and cannot be immediately fixed, a suspect may be transferred to
another patrol car or taken to another local police station that has working equipment. Implementing strict tape storage policies and limiting
officer access to video evidence libraries can avoid situations in which
tapes are altered or recordings are lost. Like other sensitive pieces of
police evidence, access to police tapes must be limited to a few supervisors and the detectives working on the case. Tapes that are not needed
for further investigatory purposes may be erased to save space and pro261
tect the privacy of suspects.
E.

DEFENSE OBJECTIONS

Despite their potential value in exonerating innocent suspects,
many defense attorneys also oppose recording police interviews. 262 A
primary concern for defense attorneys is that videotaping may be employed selectively and sporadically. Thus, police may use recording
when they believe that a confession will be readily forthcoming, but
choose not to use taping in interviews that require longer interrogations
or involve potentially "sympathetic" suspects. If a recording is created
that highlights the unreliability or suggestiveness of a suspect, officers
may also choose to destroy the tape. In order to prove reversible error,
the Supreme Court requires defendants to meet the nearly impossible
standard of proving that a videotaped interrogation contained substantial exculpatory evidence of innocence and that officers were aware of
this value and erased the tape in "bad faith." 26 3 Of course, if the federal
government intends to use the recording at trial it must provide defense
counsel with a copy under federal criminal rules of evidence. 264 Many
state recording proposals also require prosecutors to provide defendants
with videotapes before trial. 2 65 But even if videotapes are provided to
defense counsel, any recording of a confession, even a false confession, is
a terrible burden for the accused to overcome.
261. See McMahon, supra n. 202, at C6.
262. See Geller, supra n. 2, at 7.
263. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
264. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A) ('Upon a defendant's request, the government must
disclose to the defendant the substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant, before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by a person the defendant knew
was a government agent if the government intends to use the statement at trial.").
265. See e.g Wash. H. 1932, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2003) ("[A] statement made by a defendant during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible as evidence against the defendant
in a criminal proceeding unless ... (f) The defendant was provided with a complete and
accurate copy of the recording not later than twenty days before the date of the criminal
proceeding.").
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In one of the most infamous wrongful conviction cases of the past
twenty years, the videotaped confessions of Antron McCray, Kevin Richardson, Raymond Santana, and Kharey Wise convinced prosecutors, jurors, and New Yorkers that they brutally raped and nearly murdered the
"Central Park Jogger."2 66 Although the videotape captured some factual
errors, inconsistencies in the suspects' stories and the suggestive questioning methods of detectives, the admissions of the four 2 67 teenagers
were damning. Absent recordings of the prior fourteen to thirty hours of
interrogation, the jury could not properly assess the reliability of the confessions. 268 It took a confession from the true perpetrator and DNA evidence to eventually exonerate the Central Park Jogger defendants in
2002.269

Psychologist G. Daniel Lassiter of Ohio University claims that videotaped interrogations and confessions may also actually keep jurors from
detecting coercion. 2 70 Camera angles can be manipulated to focus solely
on the suspect, misrepresenting the setting in which the interrogation is
taking place. 27 1 What the jury does not see, the demeanor and expression of interrogators, may be critical in determining the reliability of a
27 2
confession.
The solution to claims of selective or incomplete use of videotaping is
to require videotaping of interrogations and confessions in their entirety.
By excluding tapes that are incomplete or that manipulate camera angles as prejudicial, judges can shape the policies and practices of local
police stations. Although police may complain that few jurors may want
to sit through twelve or fourteen hours of an interrogation, defense counsel should have the opportunity to glean interrogation tapes for evidence
of psychological or physical coercion. Defense counsel can decide what
portions of the interrogation should be shown to the jury to give jurors a
better idea why a defendant may have confessed falsely.
In Chicago, separate juries recently acquitted two men accused of
murder and indicated that the absence of the complete interrogation on
tape undermined the credibility of recorded confessions. 273 One of the
266. See Saul Kassin, False Confesssions and the Jogger Case, N.Y. Times, A31 (Nov. 1,
2002).
267. A fifth suspect, Yusef Salaam, did not confess on tape. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra n. 54, at 34.
270. G. Daniel Lassiter et. al., Criminal Confessions on Videotape: Does Camera Perspective Bias their Perceived Veracity?, 7 Current Res. in Soc. Psychol. (2001) (available at
www.uiowa.edu/-grpproc/crisp/crisp.7.1.htm); see also Tom Siegfried, Camera Can Sway
Jury's View of Video Confession, Dallas Morning News, 3C (Feb. 17, 2003).
271. Lassiter, supra n. 270, at 2-3; see also Gudjonsson, supra n. 29, at 40.
272. Id.
273. Angela Rozas & Joshua Howes, Two Juries Dubious over Confession Tapes' Merits;
They Wanted InterrogationsIncluded, Chi. Trib. 1 (Aug. 17, 2003).
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murder suspects, Leroy Washington, confessed after thirty four hours in
custody. The other suspect, eighteen-year-old Terry Wilson, confessed
after eighteen hours of detention. A juror in the Wilson case noted, "I,
more or less throughout, totally ignored what the kid was saying on the
confession ...I didn't know enough about what preceded it to know if it
2 74
was true or not."

F.

EXCEPTIONS AND REMEDIES

Both prosecutors and criminal defendants may be wary of a videotaping requirement that gives either too broad or too narrow of a remedy for the failure to record an interrogation. Most state legislatures and
courts that have considered the issue have determined that failure to
record an interrogation should render the contents of that interrogation
inadmissible except for purposes of impeachment. 2 75 However, most
videotaping rules also leave open exceptions based on mistake, excuse, or
feasibility. For instance, in Stephan, the court held that unrecorded custodial interrogations were subject to exclusion "only if the failure [to record] is unexcused." 27 6 The Alaskan Court placed the burden on the
state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that recording the interrogation was not feasible. 27 7 By contrast, the Minnesota Supreme
Court found that unrecorded interrogations should only be excluded if
the violation of the recording rule could be deemed "substantial." The
Court defined substantial to include situations in which the "violation
78
was gross, willful and prejudicial to the accused." 2
To make a recording rule more palatable for police, prosecutors, and
the public it is probably necessary to leave open a "good faith" exception
for equipment failure. Categorical exclusion of all unrecorded police interrogations would create strong incentives among police officers to ensure that taping equipment was in good working order and functioning
properly during interviews. However, vigilance is unlikely to prevent
the occasional, unanticipated technical glitch. In these rare cases, the
Louisiana Senate Bill may offer a useful model. 2 79 The Bill provides
that to admit unrecorded statements, the prosecution must prove by
"clear and convincing" evidence, that equipment failed and "obtaining
274. Id.
275. See e.g. H. 1138, 103d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2003); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d
1156 (Alaska 1985); State v.Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).
276. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1162 ("Acceptable excuses," noted by Alaska's Court, include
equipment or power malfunction or the refusal of a suspect to answer questions).
277. Id.
278. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 593.
279. La. S. 734, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (available at http://www.legis.state.1a.us/leg-docs/
04RS/CVT9/OUT/0000L6DI.PDF).
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replacement equipment was not feasible." 28 0 This narrow exception ensures that in actual instances of equipment failure, officers will seek out
alterative equipment.
G.

THE LIMITS OF VIDEOTAPE

Even if a videotape does capture every moment and nuance of an
interrogation, the existence of an electronic recording does not ensure
that jurors will cease finding some false confessors guilty and guilty suspects innocent. Apart from the flaws and subjectivity inherent within
the recording process itself, each juror views tapes through their own
subjective lens. The trial of Los Angeles police officers in the beating of
Rodney King provides an excellent example of how different subjective
understandings can shape a juror's perception of videotape. 28 1 During
the criminal trial of the LAPD officers, defense attorneys broke the film
down, frame by frame, and argued that all fifty-six blows delivered by
officers were justifiable uses of force. 28 2 After viewing the tape more
than thirty times, an all white, Simi Valley jury accepted defense counsel's interpretation of the video and acquitted the officers. Not only did
the jury endorse the defense's interpretation of the seemingly damning
videotape, but they also believed officer's accounts of what had taken
28 3
place before the videotaping.
As the King trial indicates, context is critical in providing the framework for which jurors will understand videotape evidence. Good lawyering and good expert witness testimony by defense counsel or prosecutors
can plant doubt in jurors' minds about what took place before the video
camera started to roll and convince them that what seems obvious at
first glance is not reality. A partial solution to this problem is for police
officers or detectives to preface any interrogation with an explanation of
the context in which the recording is taking place. Indeed, many videotaping policies require officers to begin tapes with a short introductory
statement revealing the time and location of the interview as well as a
statement regarding the Miranda status of the suspect. 28 4 From defense
counsel's perspective, however, short of videotaping a suspect from the
moment of arrest to the moment of trial, no recording requirement can
ever fully protect the criminal suspect.
280. Id.
281. Regina Coleman, Why Seeing Isn't Always Believing, 21 W. St. U. L. Rev. 321, 32734 (1993) (arguing that white, Simi Valley jurors were predisposed to accepting the defense's interpretation of the tape, because they had much more favorable views of law enforcement than African-Americans in Los Angeles).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 331-32.
284. See e.g Portland,supra n. 165.
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THE BENEFITS OF VIDEO-RECORDING
FOR CRIMINAL SUSPECTS
A.

CREATING AN OBJECTIVE RECORD

In his 1993 study, William Geller found that videotaping interrogations and confessions creates more incriminating and more exculpatory
evidence for trial. 28 5 Videotaping provides a more accurate record of the
circumstances in which interrogations take place and allows both judges
and jurors to better assess the suspect and the interrogator. For guilty
suspects, a taped interrogation and confession may encourage them to
enter a plea bargain. 2 86 For innocent suspects, video recordings may explain what precipitated a false confession. In cases in which the suspect
is young, mentally ill, intoxicated, or retarded a videotaped record allows
judges and jurors the opportunity to see for themselves how the interrogator may have influenced the suspect
In a number of cases, videotaped interviews have already proven
their value as tools of justice. For example, the taping of Richard Bingham's interrogation and confession in the rape and murder of a 17-yearold in Alaska may have prevented his conviction. 28 7 Bingham contended
that he suffered from blackouts and had no memory of the crime; juror's
accepted his story after seeing his drunken confession. 288 Without a
videotaped record, jurors may not have any convincing evidence that a
2 89
suspect is suggestible or was easily coerced into confessing.
Even in cases in which suspects are not predisposed to confess, videotapes allow fact-finders to assess the credibility of confessions. Tapes
capture the tone of the suspect's voice and her demeanor. While the
transcript of a suspect's confession might convey the appearance of guilt,
a videotape of the same confession may reveal that the suspect was
slumping into a chair or barely coherent from sleep deprivation. Even
the emphasis a suspect places on different syllables in a phrase may con2 90
vey a materially significant difference.
285. See Geller, supra n. 2, at 6.
286. Id. at 7.
287. Jan Hoffman, As Miranda Rights Erode, Police Get Confessions from Innocent People, N.Y. Times Al (Mar. 30, 1998).
288. Id.
289. For example, in Connecticut, Richard Lapointe, a mentally handicapped man suffering from Dandy-Walker Syndrome, confessed to the rape and murder of his wife's grandmother after nine and a half hours of interrogation. Lapointe's confession was riddled with
inconsistencies and he was probably physically incapable of committing the crime. Absent
a recording of his interrogation, Lapointe's defense attorney had no way of definitively
proving the unreliability of the confession and Lapointe was sentenced to life in prison. Leo
& Ofshe, Consequences, supra n. 38, at 459-60.
290. See DeMarzo & de Vise, supran. 25 ("One 'confession' reviewed by the Herald, that
of Frank Lee Smith, turned out to be nothing more than an oblique admission of guilt - at
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Finally, an objective record also eliminates the need for a "swearing
contest" in which officers and suspects present vastly different stories
about what happened in the interrogation room. 29 1 The "swearing contest" between officers and criminal suspects is not much of a contest. In
the absence of material exculpatory evidence, (which may not exist in
many cases), false confessors are faced with the very difficult burden of
proving: 1) their confession was a lie induced by the police, 2) they are
now telling the truth, and 3) the jury should not find this denial unreliable. By contrast, police officers and detectives traditionally have had the
advantages of: 1) status and respect within the community, 2) a perceived lack of self-interest in the outcome, and 3) the corroborating testimony of colleagues. If used correctly, video cameras provide a neutral
record of events that can eliminate "swearing matches" and preconceived
notions of innocence and guilt.
B.

PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Videotaping suspect interviews documents the manipulative and potentially coercive tactics that officers sometimes use to elicit confessions.
In the confines of a windowless interrogation room or the backseat of a
cruiser, a suspect may understand his confession as the only means of
survival. Michael Crowe falsely confessed to the murder of his sister
only after telling investigators: "The only reason I'm trying to lie here is
because you presented me with two paths, one I'm definitely afraid of.
I'd rather die than go to jail."29 2 After watching over ten hours of videotape in which overzealous investigators threatened, bullied, and lied to
Crowe, a California Superior Court judge dismissed the case. 29 3 For
those suspects who break under police compulsion and confess falsely,
the videotape provides their only reasonable means of exoneration.
Many scholars also view the video recording requirement as an important supplement to Miranda,ensuring that the warning is given and
exposing cases in which interrogation continues after Mirandaprivileges
are invoked. 2 94 Richard Leo found that officers continued interrogating
best. Detectives claimed that Smith blurted out that a witness couldn't have seen him at
the crime scene because it was dark. He never told police that he was the killer. But court
papers characterized the outburst as a confession, and the statement helped put an innocent man on Death Row for 14 years. Smith died of cancer months before his
exoneration.").
291. See Sullivan, supra n. 7, at 9.
292. See Dobb, supra n. 52.
293. Wanda J. DeMarzo & Daniel de Vise, Experts: Tape Police Interrogations,Miami
Herald (Dec. 24, 2002) (available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/newsaocal/
4804170.htm).
294. See Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda'sPracticalEffect: SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 N.W. U. L. Rev. 500, 556-57 (1996).
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suspects almost 20 percent of the time after invocation of Miranda
rights, or in 4 percent of all interrogations. 295 An officer's failure to read
Miranda warnings or failure to stop questioning a suspect can easily be
2 96
documented on camera.
Videotaping interactions between officers and suspects can also provide evidence in civil and criminal suits brought against police officers.
Although only about 6 percent of arrests involve the use of force 29 7 and
officers use excessive force 2 98 in only about 1.8 percent of encounters
with potential offenders, 2 99 claims of police abuse are very high. A 1991
Gallup poll reported that 5 percent of Americans believed that they had
suffered abuse at the hands of police. 30 0 Among minorities, 9 percent
percent reported police abuse. 30 1 Videotapes can change police behavior
302
Ofon the street, behind the wheel and in the interrogation room.
ficers may even temper their use of practices that may not violate the
law, but that jurors and judges may find coercive or reprehensible.

295. Leo, Inside, supra n. 67, at 276-77.
296. Video cameras may also protect a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures related to pretextual traffic stops. In many states,
videotaping has also become a useful tool in fighting against racial profiling. See e.g Barnhardt, supra n. 24.
297. Kenneth Adams, Measuring the Prevalence of Police Abuse of Force, Police Violence, 61 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
298. Graham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("Determining whether the force
used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a
careful balancing of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake .... Our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or
investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it .... '[tihe test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,'. . . however, its proper
application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.").
299. Robert Warden, The Causes of Police Brutality, Police Violence 34 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
300. Timothy Flanagan & Michael Vaughn, Public OpinionAbout Police Violence, Police
Violence 120 (William Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
301. Id.
302. But see Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra n. 38, at 466 (describing how the Duncanville, Texas, police department fired Lieutenant Robert Moore after he obtained a confession from Tammy Lynn Harrison by threatening her with the electric chair).
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THE BENEFITS OF VIDEO-RECORDING
FOR POLICE DEPARTMENTS
A.

TACTICAL ADVANTAGES

The greatest beneficiaries of a mandatory video recording rule are
not criminal suspects and defense attorneys, but police and prosecutors.
William Geller's survey revealed that nearly every police agency in
America found videotaping useful and planned to continue the practice.30 3 Police agencies reported that recording had little effect on a suspect's propensity to confess and increased the quantity and quality of
incriminating evidence available at trial.30 4 In addition to evidentiary
advantages, videotaping can provide tactical advantages to police officers
05
during interrogations.3
With the videotape rolling, officers can concentrate on the suspect
instead of their copious notes. The interview can progress at a natural,
conversational pace rather than through stilted questions and answers.
This may give suspects less time to concoct answers and may make interrogations more effective and more time efficient. Videotaping also allows
other officers to passively participate in the interrogation process. Supervisors monitoring interrogations through live feeds or over police car
radios can evaluate the performance of officers on the spot and unobtrusively redirect lines of questioning. In some cases interviewers can take
breaks, glean the information provided thus far, and adjust interviewing
methods. Police officers may even playback portions of the interrogation
to the interviewee when they catch him in a lie.
B.

OFFICER TRAINING AND MONITORING

Recording interrogations and suspect-police interactions also provides a key training tool for officers. Several scholars note that police
investigators often possess weak interviewing skills. 30 6 Police interrogators commonly interrupt suspects, speak too quickly, ask loaded or
leading questions, and proceed haphazardly through interviews. 30 7
Videotaping allows officers to learn from their own mistakes and the
mistakes of other officers. Police departments can accumulate videotape
data to find patterns and trends to better tailor interrogations to fit particular criminal profiles. Apart from suspect interviews, police cruiser
and officer-mounted cameras provide police recruits with real-life confrontations. New officers can benefit significantly from assessing how an
303. Geller, supra n. 2, at 10.
304. Id.
305. See Sullivan, supra n. 7, at 6 (noting that videotaping is an officer's version of"instant replay.").
306. Conti, supra n. 41, at 30.
307. Id.
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officer performed in a difficult circumstance and what techniques or
strategies may have diffused the situation. If different tapes of the same
incident are preserved, officers can assess complex situations and judge
the behavior and responses of multiple actors. Finally, videos can document the tragic errors that officers sometimes make and ensure that
those mistakes are not needlessly repeated.
Moreover, videotapes of suspect-police interactions are also useful
for internal monitoring. 3 08 Police departments that have standard performance reviews may look to videotapes in evaluating officer behavior
and performance. Instead of awarding promotions solely on the basis of
the number of arrests or the recommendations of other officers, superiors
can review tapes of the officer engaging suspects in the interrogation
room or in real-life situations. Likewise, if an officer has received a number of complaints, internal review committees can investigate by reviewing not only the incident in question, but also recent interactions the
30 9
officer has had with criminal suspects.
C.

MORE CONVICTIONS AND FEWER SUPPRESSION CLAIMS

Prosecutors have found that video taping interrogations and confessions results in more guilty pleas and more severe sentences. 3 10 Recording eliminates the need for a "swearing contest" between police officers
3 11
and suspects that propose different versions of the same interview.
This allows for fewer suppression motions from defendants and deters
frivolous appeals. 3 12 Videotaped confessions give prosecutors leverage
in obtaining more plea bargains on better terms for the state. 3 13 Prosecutors have also discovered that recorded confessions are powerful, and
308. Andrew Flanagin, The Impact of Contemporary Communication and Information
Technologies on Police Organizations,Law Enforcement, Communication and Community
96 (Howard Giles ed., 2002) ("[Platrol car videotapes of traffic stops have been used not
only to document officers' activities (in order to provide evidence to build legal cases against
criminal suspects) but also for training officers. Videotapes of traffic stops can serve as
examples of both proper and improper field behaviors.").
309. For those detectives that cross the line and abuse criminal suspects, videotapes can
indicate their lack of fitness to supervisors. For instance, recently in Charlottesville an
interrogation room camera captured a detective taunting a suspect and then beating him
after he pushed a snapshot camera away from his face. The officer is now facing assault
charges. April Witt, Maryland Weighs Taping Police Interviews, Wash. Post B1 (Feb. 12,
2002).
310. Geller, supra n. 2, at 6, 10; but see supra n. 218. (comparing the benefits of having
fewer cases brought to trial must be weighed against the administrative costs of presenting
videotape evidence to juries. The extensive use of videotape evidence may elongate trials
as juries are forced to watch and interpret several hours of interrogation).
311. Joseph Grano, Confessions, Truth and the Law, 221 (U. Mich. Press 1994).
312. Cassell, Empirical, supra n. 197, at 231.
313. See generally Sullivan, supra n. 7.
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often irrefutable, evidence at trial. Videotapes sway juries. 3 14 Indeed,
one study has concluded that jurors presented with videotape evidence
retain 100 percent more information than those who are not shown
videotape evidence and 650 percent more than those that only hear oral
evidence. 3 15 In some cases, videotaping a suspect's statements may lead
to a conviction months or even years after the interrogation when subsequent incriminating evidence is uncovered. Tapes may allow detectives
to continue pursuing cases in which they strongly suspect guilt or have
obtained a confession, but have no corroborating evidence. At trial prosecutors will not have to rely wholly on the memories of detectives and
incomplete or missing files: they have a complete record of the suspect's
interrogation.
D.

CAPTURING THE TRUE PERPETRATOR

Videotaping interrogations can also help police departments and
prosecutors recognize false confessors. If a videotaped confession is suspicious or was obtained under tainted circumstances, police should explore alternative theories and alternative suspects. 3 16 In the rush to
solve crimes, initial impressions and assumptions can prove erroneous.
Convicting the "wrong man" can allow the true perpetrator to remain at
large. For instance, after the false confession of Jerry Frank Townsend
(later exonerated by DNA tests), the real killer of a girl in East Saint
Louis went on to kill two more girls. 3 1 7 In a second case, the false confession of a welder from Maryland detracted attention from a rapist and
murderer who subsequently assaulted five more women. 318 Ensuring
that prosecutors bring the right person to trial not only saves taxpayers'
time and money, in some instances, it may even save lives.
X.

CONCLUSION

Reformers may view the recent trend towards video recording interrogations with optimism, but they should remain critical of newly
adopted recording procedures and policies. Although videotaping may be
the best method of ensuring that a suspect's rights are protected in the
interrogation room and beyond, it is not a panacea for the problem of
false confession. If improperly structured or monitored, police officers
314. Id. at 311.
315. Karen Martin Campbell, Roll Tape-Admissibility of Videotape Evidence in the
Courtroom, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1445, 1447 (1996).
316. See Warden, supra n. 23 (estimating that of the 25 suspects convicted on the basis
of a false confession in Illinois, officers may have pursued viable alternative suspects in 13
of the cases).
317. Margaret Talbot, True Confessions, The Atlantic (July/Aug. 2001) (available at
www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200312/talbot).
318. Id.
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and prosecutors can easily circumvent recording requirements. One possible consequence of mandating video recording in police stations is that
officers may be more inclined to conduct interrogations in other contexts.
Thus, any sensible recording policy must look past the station house and
consider video cameras in police cars and mobile camera technologies.
To properly protect the interests of criminal suspects, videotaping
rules must require taping of the entire interrogation and confession. Recording only confessions may actually lead to the wrongful conviction of
more false confessors. Taping must also be applied uniformly in all criminal cases or to an entire class or category of cases to ensure that the
rights of suspects are equally protected. Ultimately, the success of any
state or locally implemented videotaping rule hinges on three corollaries:
(1) developing broad and clear recording policies and rules; (2) providing
the requisite technological and financial resources to municipal police
departments; and (3) obtaining the cooperation of police officers and
prosecutors in implementing, monitoring, and enforcing recording
policies.
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